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INTRODUCTION
The law of torts has been twice blessed over the past decade.
The law and economics theorists have enriched and elevated the level
of discourse concerning the policy of tort compensation rules.' Sim-
plistic discussion of such notions as risk-spreading, compensation,
and deterrence has been replaced by sophisticated literature that
takes into account subtleties and interactions that were simply not
considered a short while ago. Although not totally unrelated to the
law-economics discipline,3 tort law has been subjected to searching
I. See generally G. CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
811 (1980); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Henderson,
Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the
Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1980); Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of
the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981).
2. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, §§ 6.11, 6.12; Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981).
3. The law.economics literature has not disregarded process. See generally R. POSNER,
supra note 1, §§ 19.1-23.4; Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J, LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
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examination by scholars who, for want of a better term, I shall label
as "process" or "justiciability" theorists. Dialogue that a short time
ago was limited to the rather sterile question of who should do
it-the legislature or the courts--has now focused on the rather sig-
nificant limitations that attend the judicial process. It is no secret
that since the anschauung of Professor Henderson's classic article,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication,6 I have been preoccupied with the unsettling
questions which he propounded. In fact, a good case can be made for
the proposition that I have become more Hendersonian than Hender-
son.7 Although differences remain between us, the common ground
It is certainly possible to explain the multifactor duty analysis set forth in this paper in
efficiency terms. Judicial intervention, utilizing the reasonableness standard in cases where the
judicial error factor is high, may lead to less than optimal resource allocation. Nonetheless, I
am persuaded that pushing the entirety of duty analysis into efficiency theory may be the
equivalent of slamming the door on an overfull closet. Many of the factors have an indepen-
dent moral base and would stand alone whether or not they met efficiency norms. Cf.
Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution and Justice, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 799, 804-11 (inad-
equacy of efficiency theory to explain rape, defamation, and burglary rules). See infra note
112.
4. The realization that process concerns play a role in shaping substantive tort law can
be found in the work of the late Dean Leon Green. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negli-
gence Cases (pts. 1 & 2), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929).
However, the argument that the judicial process is inherently unsuited for the litigation of
polycentric tort cases moved the dialogue to a much more radical posture, since it challenged
the justiciability of the reasonableness norm that is central to most tort litigation. See Hender-
son, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Judicial Review of
Design Choices]; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Expanding the Negligence
Concept]; Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1982). Others
have expressed similar concerns with the ability of the present tort litigation system to deliver
just results. See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 643 (1978); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products
Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability];
Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Tech-
nology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part I-Judicial Law Making, 64 W. VA.
L. REV. 115, 121-22 (1962); James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial
Process, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 315, 333-37 (1959). This controversy is exemplified by the debate
concerning the adoption of comparative fault. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla.
1973); Maki v. Frelk, 40 III. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Phillips, The Case for Judicial
Adoption of Comparative Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C.L. REV. 295 (1980); Comments on
Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature
Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).
6. Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 4.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 11-31, 123-25. Professor Henderson supports na-
tional products liability legislation that seeks to codify the negligence standard. See Hearings
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upon which we tread is the deeply held belief that the tort litigation
system cannot stand the strain of a totally unstructured standard of
reasonableness. In a recent publication, I examined this thesis at
considerable length and suggested a structured middle ground be-
tween rigid rules and the open-ended reasonableness standard, which
I believe to be analytically sound and politically feasible.8 In fact, I
suggest that the middle ground has already been occupied by sensi-
tive and responsible courts. The middle-ground approach operates as
a screening mechanism for cases which must be filtered out of the
tort litigation system unless the system is to take on the complexion
of a Rube Goldberg cartoon.
Mine is not the only proposal extant for reducing the intolerable
strains that exist on the tort litigation system. The product liability
crisis has, for the first time, created a real possibility that major sub-
stantive tort law reform will take place at the federal level.9 The
contributions of highly respected academicians to the legislative de-
on S. 2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statements of Prof. James A. Henderson)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 Senate Hearings]; Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defec-
tive Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978). 1 believe
that the multifactor duty analysis set forth in this article corresponds more closely to the solu-
tions to the justiciability problems propounded by Henderson in his earlier writings, see, e.g.,
Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 4, than to his more recent endorse-
ment of legislation that seeks to control the administration of risk-utility analysis.
8. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect
Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521
(1982).
9. The focus is currently on the Kasten bill, Product Liability Act, S. 44, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S284 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate Bill],
and on the Shumway bill, Product Liability Act of 1983, H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. H2328 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as House Bill]. S. 44 is
identical to S. 2631, which was reported by a unanimous Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation on December 1 (legislative day November 30), 1982. S. REP. No.
670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 SENATE REPORT]. Federal legisla-
tive activity began with the promulgation of the MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT,
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MUPLA], by the United States Department
of Commerce. Legislative hearings have generated intense interest from both consumer and
industry groups. See 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 7; Product Liability: Legislative Hear-
ings on H.R. 5571, H.R. 5258, H.R. 1061, H.R. 2891, H.R. 4204, H.R. 1675, H.R. 1676,
H.R. 2964, H.R. 5626 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
cited as 1979 House Hearings]. For an analysis of an early version of S. 2631, see Twerski,
National Product Liability Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18
IDAHO L. REv. 411 (1982).
State legislative activity has also been considerable. For a comprehensive list of the vari-
ous state statutes and their major provisions, see id. at 412 n.7.
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liberations have been significant.' 0 Their suggestions appear to me
well-intentioned and, at first glance, capable of limiting the unwar-
ranted extension of liability into areas that are within the legitimate
discretionary ambit of manufacturers. But initial appearances are
deceiving. The proposals focusing on limiting the range and scope of
the various factors that comprise risk-utility analysis fail to account
for important policy concerns that have traditionally operated as a
significant brake on the unbridled reasonableness doctrine. If the
middle-ground approach is descriptive of the behavior of courts, and
if courts are, in fact, motivated to limit liability for reasons that can-
not be expressed by formulation and reformulation of the negligence
formula, then legislative marching orders are not likely to be mean-
ingful. Courts have a nasty habit of imposing their will on legisla-
tures that ask them to act irrationally. Policy decisions of significant
moment can be masked in language that smacks of pedestrian fact-
finding. In short, lawmaking and high policy can be driven under-
ground. The proposals that seek to curb the abuses of risk-utility
analysis by fragmenting the fact-finding process invite such
subterfuge.
To make my case, I shall briefly restate some of the basic tenets
of the process theorists with some emphasis on my most recent work.
Drawing on other examples from the law of torts, I hope to demon-
strate that justiciability concerns have long been recognized as ger-
mane to the fundamental duty issue. The public law nature of tort
law also invites comparison to some of the classic constitutional jus-
ticiability cases. The reader will not be surprised to learn that the
factors that are considered by courts in deciding the justiciability
issue cut across specific subject matter lines. Admittedly, the leap
10. The MUPLA, supra note 9, was authored by the United States Department of
Commerce Task Force on Product Liability and Accident Compensation. The Task Force was
chaired by Professor Victor E. Schwartz of the University of Cincinnati School of Law. See
Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579
(1980); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the
House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979) (testimony of Prof. Victor E.
Schwartz). Professor James A. Henderson, Jr. of the Boston University School of Law had a
significant role in drafting major provisions that were ultimately incorporated into S. 44, Sen-
ate Bill, supra note 9. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Prof. James A.
Henderson, Jr.). Professor David Owen of the University of South Carolina School of Law was
instrumental in drafting the Product Liability Act of 1982, H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
127 CONG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981). See 1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 7
(statement of Prof. David G. Owen). H.R. 5214 was reintroduced this year, with some varia-
tions, as H.R. 2729, House Bill, supra note 9. 129 CONG. REc. E1821 (daily ed. Apr. 25,
1983) (statement of Rep. Shumway). The contributions of these outstanding scholars to the
legislative effort demand that their work product be given careful attention.
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from highly visible constitutional cases to seemingly more mundane
tort law is considerable, but the chasm is not as wide as one might
suppose. I shall then turn to alternative proposals for ameliorating
the "standards" crisis in product liability law and demonstrate that
for a host of reasons such proposals will exacerbate, rather than alle-
viate, the crisis. There is no alternative to judicial lawmaking to ac-
complish realistic screening of cases that should be regulated by the
tort litigation system. Having firmly established the policymaking
role of the judiciary in products litigation, I shall reexamine the em-
battled consumer expectation test and suggest that, with proper ad-
vance judicial screening, the test may play a significant role in prod-
ucts litigation.
I. JUSTICIABILITY AND" THE LAW OF TORTS
A decade ago Professor Henderson set forth a thesis that, for
the first time, forced hard attention to be focused upon the jus-
ticiability of design defect claims."1 He argued that for a case to be
justiciable, the issues that comprise the claim must be separable and
resolvable in a sequential fashion. 12 Yet, the basic standard in design
defect litigation is the reasonableness or societal acceptability of a
given design. To resolve the reasonableness question, a court must
balance such factors as cost, esthetics, safety, and utility against
harm potential. The interdependence of these various elements is ap-
parent. For example, if one changes the design of a product to en-
hance its safety, it may be necessary to alter other aspects of the
product that affect its esthetics, utility, and cost. Once the proposed
changes are made in formulating a new hypothetical design, it then
may be necessary to reexamine the safety decision. Changing the
nonsafety aspects of the design may be of such significance that the
initial safety decision, which led to these changes, will have to be
reconsidered in toto or scaled down to more modest proportions. This
will again cause the reexamination of the impact on safety on each
and every aspect of the product-setting us once again into a never-
ending cycle.13 This process is all the more complex because one can-
not merely weigh the safety considerations against the nonsafety as-
pects of the product. Each element of the negligence formula is a
variable that is subject to change depending on what is decided in
11. Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 4.
12. Id. at 1534-39.
13. See id. at 1539-42.
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regard to each of the other variables. Such a process, which speaks
to what is good for society or, as Henderson puts it, "How much
safety is enough?" raises serious justiciability problems that cannot
be easily dismissed.14 Henderson concluded that where courts are
called upon to establish safety standards without reliance on existing
industry standards or statutory safety rules, the polycentric nature of
the litigation demands that the courts stay their hand and permit the
manufacturer's managerial safety decision to govern.
Over the years, in a series of articles that I coauthored, my col-
leagues and I sought to come to grips with the rather substantial
arguments that Henderson posed.15 This past year, after considera-
ble reflection and soul-searching, I concluded that Henderson's basic
thesis was correct.16 The open-ended reasonableness doctrine should
not be the sole test for deciding whether a manufacturer has violated
its duty to those injured as a result of a'design-related product in-
jury. My reasons for reaching this conclusion, however, were not lim-
ited to the polycentric nature of design defect litigation. It became
clear to me that in design defect cases, courts have identified a host
of policy reasons on which they relied in deciding to direct verdicts
14. Many courts have given serious consideration to the Henderson thesis. See, e.g.,
Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bowman v. General Motors
Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241 & n.12 (E.D.Pa. 1977); Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 69 Cal. App.
3d 115, 122, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833 (1977), reconsidered, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder]
PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 8340, at 17,717 (Sept. 18, 1978) (opinion withdrawn from publi-
cation, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978)); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 795-96,
381 N.E.2d 715, 734-35 (1978) (Jones, J., dissenting); Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362
So. 2d 816, 819 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,
326, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1977).
It has been my position that design cases run the gamut from those that are highly
polycentric to those that hardly raise the polycentricity problem. Thus, the degree of polycen-
tricity should be one of a number of factors that a court should consider. See Twerski, supra
note 8, at 551-53. In Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982),
the Michigan court took a position consistent with the one that I advocated. The intermediate
appellate court, utilizing the Henderson polycentricity thesis, found the case, which dealt with
the design of a forklift, highly polycentric and thus nonadjudicable. In reversing, the Michigan
Supreme Court expressed general agreement with the Henderson thesis, but found that the
design implicated in this particular case was not so polycentric as to make it nonadjudicable.
Professor Henderson himself has recognized that polycentricity concerns may not be of the
same magnitude in every case. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note
4, at 1539, 1540 n.29.
15. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Prod-
ucts Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings];
Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability, supra
note 4.
16. Twerski, supra note 8.
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for defendants. I argued that significant policy choices were often
masked in the rather pedestrian holdings that a directed verdict was
in order because reasonable persons could not differ on the evidence.
In reality, however, if one carefully examined the cases, one could
identify the factors that were actually at work.1" Although courts
often highlight one factor or another as the major reason for di-
recting a verdict, it is usually possible to identify a cluster of factors
that lie behind a court's determination that the defendant owed no
duty to the plaintiff. The factors that I suggested governed directed
verdict decisions in design defect cases are the following:
(1) Polycentricity: Aspects of the product design may be re-
lated in such a way that any design change would substantially
affect the cost, utility, safety, or esthetics of the product.
(2) Close risk-utility proof: The task of weighing and balanc-
ing the product's potential for harm against its utility may be diffi-
cult or impossible.
(3) State of the art: The alternative design may not be practi-
cally feasible in light of the state of the art.
(4) Tenuous causation: The case for causation-in-fact may be
tenuous.
(5) Shifting duty: Independent and responsible decisionmakers
may have played a significant role in assessing and utilizing the
allegedly hazardous product.
(6) Consumer choice: Consumers may have the option to
purchase a similar product without the alleged safety hazard.
(7) Obviousness of danger: The hazard may be open and obvi-
ous to the ordinary consumer.
(8) Cost: An alternative design could substantially raise the
cost of the product to the consumer.
(9) Design safety review process: The safety review process
that led to the formulation of the product's design may have been
extensive.
(10) Legislation: The government may have played a role in
regulating the product's design.18
The suggested factors break down into two major categories: (1) in-
stitutional limitations preventing courts from fairly litigating design
defect cases,19 and (2) the existence of alternative decisionmaking
17. id. at 578-95.
18. Id. at 527, 550-78.
19. Factors falling within the category of institutional limitations include polycentricity,
close risk-utility proof, state of the art, and tenuous causation. These factors are discussed in
Twerski, supra note 8, at 551-64.
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mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of product
safety.20 In deciding whether a verdict should be directed for the
defendant, a court would examine the potential difficulties it would
encounter if it should undertake to resolve a given design question. It
might discover that the design changes that must be considered to
establish that standard which renders the challenged design unsafe
would raise serious polycentricity problems.21 A review of the evi-
dence might reveal that, at very best, the court was dealing with a
very close-call question as to whether the suggested safety device
would add to or detract from the overall safety of the product. This
becomes particularly serious because the plaintiff need only pinpoint
an alternative design that would have avoided the particular injury
to this plaintiff, whereas the defendant is forced to defend the gen-
eral acceptability of the design.22 A court might also reflect on the
fairness of litigating the adequacy of a design that was instituted
many years before the injury took place.23 Where liability is based
on negligence, there is a very real question as to whether juries can
place themselves in that frame of mind which correctly reflects socie-
tal values of yesteryear.24 A jury incapable of turning back the clock
will not be judging a negligence case, but one based in quasi-strict
liability. Finally, a court should assess whether the case confronts it
with causation problems that will allow for nothing better than an
educated guess. 25
If a court's initial assessment is that it faces serious institutional
20. Factors included in the category of alternative decisionmaking mechanisms are shift-
ing duty, consumer choice, obviousness of danger, cost, the design safety review process, and
legislation. These factors are discussed in id. at 564-78.
21. See id. at 551-53.
22. See id. at 553-56.
23. See id. at 560-61; Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liabil-
ity, 69 CAUF. L. REV. 919 (1981).
24. Although some courts have indicated that strict liability will be the governing stan-
dard in design defect and failure to warn cases, see, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90
N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033
(1974), the majority view predicates liability in design and warning cases on basic negligence
principles. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973);
Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514
S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974); see also Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980).
The negligence standard for design defect and failure to warn has been adopted by MUPLA,
supra note 9, § 104 and analysis, and by the Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(b).
25. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 562-64.
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limitations in litigating the appropriateness of the particular design,
then the court should further examine whether alternative decision-
making mechanisms may have adequately accounted for safety con-
cerns. A court might discover that the market in which the ques-
tioned product competed was vigorous-one that offered consumers
a broad choice of options.26 Or it might find that the defendant man-
ufacturer's safety review process was extensive and thorough. The
court might also find that the product was subject to extensive safety
regulation by state or federal safety agencies .2  Finally, the court
might find that to extend the protection of the safer design alterna-
tive would require the court to be excessively paternalistic by impos-
ing its will on society when, in fact, the burden of decisionmaking
should be shifted to responsible persons who can intelligently decide
for themselves the desired level of product safety.
29
If a court were to determine that its institutional limitations are
considerable-that is, it has little confidence that its own decision
processes are likely to reach a result clearly preferable to that
reached by the manufacturer-and, in addition, it has good reason
to believe that other forces existed in society that could have effec-
tively influenced the choice of whether additional safety should have
been added to the product, it would then direct a verdict for the
defendant. With the margin for error being significant, and with
some assurance that society had already scrutinized the design for
safety, a court would simply call it quits.
The analogy to the Rube Goldberg cartoon is apt. If these de-
terminations can be made at the pleading or pretrial stage, there is
little reason to crank up the judicial system when it is destined to
produce questionable results. However, even if the determinations
cannot be made until the plaintiff and/or defendant have completed
their respective cases, the directed verdict would operate to set pre-
cedent for future litigation, instructing claimants and manufacturers
as to the kinds of cases that will not be permitted to reach juries.
The process will thus allow the parties to self-screen the unworthy
cases from litigation. By expressing their holdings through directing
26. See Id. at 566-67.
27. See Id. at 574-75. See also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Per-
spectives In Products Liability, supra note 4.
28. The suggestion is not that compliance with a statute becomes an automatic ground
for a directed verdict, but rather that the legislative presence is one factor to be considered in
directing a verdict. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 576-78.
29. See Id. at 571-73.
[Val. 11:861
JUDICIAL SCREENING
verdicts in favor of defendants in clear policy language, rather than
masking their findings in fact-sensitive evidentiary terms, courts
would facilitate this weeding-out process. High policy would emerge
from its subterranean existence and provide guidance to the business
community and the courts. Admittedly, this multifactor duty ap-
proach does not provide the certainty of such old standbys as the
patent danger rule, the intended purpose rule, or the bystander rule.
Nonetheless, it would make available a body of precedent that could
give form and substance to design litigation. Cases that pass the
multifactor screening mechanism would reflect a composite judg-
ment that the alternative decisionmaking mechanisms for assuring
that safety is adequately considered were not sufficient, when re-
garded together with the error potential inherent in the litigation
process, to justify denial of the claim.30
The argument that courts have always been attentive to jus-
ticiability considerations has been recently made by Professor Hen-
derson.a He has demonstrated that a broad range of process con-
cerns have played a major role in the formulation of substantive tort
doctrine. I believe that a brief review of classical doctrine will reveal
that single-factor duty rules are best explained by a multifactor
analysis not unlike that suggested for design litigation. This, of
course, does not ipso facto make it correct. But in proposing that
courts utilize this mode of judicial screening, it is helpful to suggest
to them that they should feel relatively comfortable in doing so.
More importantly, before we go rushing headlong into the screening
process suggested by recent legislative proposals for ridding the
product liability system of unworthy cases, it is imperative that we
have a sense of a screening process that allows for both predictability
and flexibility.
30. Professor Henderson has suggested that, in reality, I have focused not only on the
two categories I have outlined (i.e., institutional limitations and alternative decisionmaking
mechanisms), but also on an evaluation of the substantive merits of the cases. He suggests that
if an analysis of the first two categories leads to the conclusion that a directed verdict is
proper, then a presumption of nondefectiveness arises, rebuttable only by clear evidence on the
side of the plaintiff in support of defect. Henderson, Why Creative Judging Won't Save the
Products Liability System, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 845, 854-55 (1983). Although I do not con-
ceive of my proposal as creating presumptions of any sort, I believe that Professor Henderson
has accurately characterized my position that close-call design defect cases should not be liti-
gated in the teeth of demonstrable judicial limitations in avoiding both factual and doctrinal
error, when there is strong evidence of extrajudicial mechanisms for control of product safety.
31. Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, supra note 4.
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II. SOMETHING OLD-A LOOK AT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
One of the oldest single factor no-duty rules is governmental
immunity from tort liability.3 2 Although that hoary rule, the subject
of significant legislative and judicial scorn, has been substantially
undermined,3 3 courts have stood fast in their support of the immu-
nity doctrine in those cases where the essence of the "special rela-
tionship between the government and its citizens" is implicated.4 It
is interesting, however, to note that a wide range of policy concerns
support the broadside conclusion that cases involving this special re-
lationship should not be subject to the reasonableness standard of
tort law.
Weiss v. Fote35 is illustrative. In that case, the plaintiff was
struck by a car that was involved in an intersection collision. The
collision propelled the car across the intersection, over the curb,
crushing the plaintiff. At trial, the plaintiff sought to establish that
the traffic signal at the intersection was negligently designed in that
the four-second clearance interval between the changes in the traffic
light was too short. As a result, the east-west traffic light turned
green before all of the north-south traffic had cleared the intersec-
tion.38 The New York Court of Appeals, reversing a jury verdict
against the city of Buffalo, held that no duty had been violated by
the city.37 The court was not prepared to go behind the planning
functions of Buffalo's traffic safety officials.
Utilizing the multifactor analysis discussed earlier, it is evident
that the court in Weiss had ample reason to refuse to expose the
governmental decision to a review of its substantive reasonableness.
The decision of whether to utilize a four- or five-second interval is
one that could involve the courts in a never-ending cycle of decision-
making. The decision as to proper time for clearance does not affect
32. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971);
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. I, II & III), 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), 34 YALE
L.J. 129 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 221 (1925); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort
(pts. IV, V, VI), 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926), 36 YALE L.J. 757 (1927), 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927).
33. See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-2680
(1976); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 139-40 (1950) (noting that major reason behind abolition of governmental immunity in
Federal Tort Claims Act was inequity of leaving injured parties remediless solely because
wrongdoer was government employee).
34. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 4, at 507.
35. 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
36. Id. at 583, 167 N.E.2d at 64, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
37. Id. at 588, 167 N.E.2d at 67, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
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this intersection alone. Traffic lights must be staggered to account
for the flow of traffic from numerous other arteries. The availability
of police to monitor traffic at other intersections is also implicated.
Two or three seconds more clearance time at any given intersection
may not be significant; multiplying that integer throughout the en-
tire city of Buffalo may well raise substantial questions of cost and
efficiency.
Complex design cases involve proof problems that raise serious
questions as to the fairness of the judicial process. The plaintiff al-
leges that the design of a system is faulty by pointing to a very spe-
cific setting in which the design did not provide adequate safety. He
can often successfully demonstrate that another design would have
avoided this particular accident. To defend the allegedly negligent
design, the defendant must argue that the alternative design would
not be as effective or safe in other instances. Thus, the defendant is
faced with an alternative design that would have avoided the partic-
ular injury which occurred, but might have caused other problems of
equal magnitude. It takes a particularly perceptive jury to be willing
to look away from the case at hand and to focus on those hypotheti-
cal instances in which the alternative design would have created
other safety problems. 8 It is little wonder that courts have pro-
ceeded with caution in this setting.
In appraising its own capabilities of fairly litigating the case, a
court may seriously doubt whether its risk-utility assessment could
accurately gauge whether the choice of the plaintiff's alternative de-
sign is superior to the one that caused the accident. This is exactly
what the court concluded in Weiss. 9 In addition, the court there
considered the fact that the traffic safety design was implemented by
an administrative agency with delegated legislative powers. To be
sure, legislative standards are not binding,40 but they should not be
disregarded by courts faced with complex choices among closely
matched alternatives.41 It is also clear in Weiss that the court as-
38. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 553-56.
39. The court in Weiss stated: "Indeed, as we read the lengthy and involved body of
testimony before the jury, there is ample basis for doubting that body's capacity to arrive at a
conclusion as to the 'clearance interval's' reasonableness." 7 N.Y.2d at 586, 167 N.E.2d at 66,
200 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14.
40. It is hornbook law that compliance with a statutory standard may be some evidence,
but is not conclusive, on the issue of non-negligence. See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v.
Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa.
Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971); W. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 36, at 203-04.
41. Thus, the mere fact that a legislative standard exists should be a significant factor in
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sessed the process of decisionmaking utilized by the traffic control
agency. The court discovered a process that had thoroughly assessed
the alternatives and had engaged in extensive fact-finding before
reaching a decision. When a court is confronted with a decisionmak-
ing process that is well structured and designed to bring sensible al-
ternatives to the fore, there is good reason to expect such an exten-
sive and thorough process to result in reasonable standards. 2 The
court further noted that the agency entrusted with the decision, in
opting for a clearance interval of four seconds, had decided the very
case that was now before the court, utilizing .the substantive risk-
utility standard that is the essence of negligence litigation. The court
stated:
We are of the opinion that the traditional reliance on a jury verdict
to assess fault and general tort liability is misplaced where a duly
authorized public planning body has entertained and passed on the
very same question of risk as would ordinarily go to the jury. Al-
though a jury verdict is to be highly regarded, it is neither sacro-
sanct nor preferable to the judgment of an expert public planning
body.43
Thus, the seemingly blunderbuss governmental immunity rules, in
truth, reflect the sensitive balancing of several factors. When courts
are convinced that their own capabilities for decisionmaking may be
seriously compromised and that the decisionmaking process to which
the questioned decision had been delegated sensitively engaged in
rigorous and reasoned deliberations; the no-duty decision is not only
defensible, it is eminently correct.
deciding whether to permit a case to be tried on the reasonableness issue. See Twerski, supra
note 8, at 578; Id. at 587-89 (discussion of Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577
P.2d 1322 (1978)).
42. For an assessment of the role that a thorough process should have on design defect
litigation, see Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Lia-
bility, supra note 4.
43. 7 N.Y.2d at 588-89, 167 N.E.2d at 67-68, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16. Thus, the court
in Weiss not only recognized the presence of a regulatory standard, but also assessed the pro-
cess that led to the establishment of the standard and evaluated the competence of the alterna-
tive decisionmaker.
In cases where courts are called on to evaluate the standards set by an administrative
agency, and the agency, as in Weiss, is not the party defendant, a court may evaluate the
integrity and independence of the agency as an additional factor in deciding whether to give
the agency standard credence. Thus, it may consider whether the agency has a reputation for
freedom from industry pressure, or whether it has developed a substantial industry orientation
toward regulation. See L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION (1965).
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III. SOMETHING NEW-FROM THE CLASSROOM TO THE STADIUM
The suggested form of duty analysis set forth above" has found
expression in several recent cases. Although the courts have yet to
articulate their analytical processes with sufficient vigor, it does not
require a quantum leap to conclude that the rudiments of mul-
tifactor analysis are well in place.
A particularly interesting analysis of limited judicial compe-
tence in complex tort litigation is found in Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc.45 The incident which gave rise to the lawsuit occurred
near the end of the first half of a football game between the Denver
Broncos and the Cincinnati Bengals. The Denver team was ahead by
a score of 21 to 3. Cincinnati had the ball on offense and attempted
a forward pass. Charles Clark was playing fullback for the Bengals
and was a prospective receiver on the play. Hackbart was playing
free safety for the Denver Broncos, defending against the pass. As
fate would have it, the forward pass was intercepted near the goal
line by a Denver linebacker, who began to run the ball upfield.
Hackbart attempted to block Clark in the end zone to keep him out
of the play. When he did so, Hackbart fell, but raised himself on one
knee to watch the play as it continued upfield. Clark, acting out of
anger and frustration, but without a specific intent to injure, stepped
forward and struck Hackbart on his back. Weeks later, it was dis-
covered that as a result of this blow, Hackbart suffered a neck injury
that caused the premature termination of his football career.
The federal district court found that the defendant had violated
no duty to the plaintiff.46 That decision was ultimately reversed by
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in an opinion that did
little to grapple with the rather formidable analysis of the district
court. 47 In deciding that civil courts could not be expected to control
44. See supra text accompanying notes 17-31.
45. 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979).
46. Id. at 356.
47. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). The court of appeals
believed that both federal and state jurisdictional principles militated against judicial restraint
in refusing to provide a forum for the litigation of this case. Id. at 521-24. The court's argu-
ment, however, appears contrived. The extensive body of law dealing with limited-duty or no-
duty rules provides a rich source of substantive doctrine from which the courts are free to
analogize without contravening jurisdictional principles. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V.
SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 415-535 (7th ed. 1982). State courts continue
their redefinition of duty rules. See, e.g., Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich.
624, 327 N.W.2d 814 (1982); Robihson v. Reed-Prentice, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440,
426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980).
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the level of violence in commercial football when there was no spe-
cific intent to injure,' 8 the district court made several observations
about the sport: Football is a game characterized by significant phys-
ical violence;' 9 the sanctions for inappropriate behavior on the foot-
ball field are set forth by a highly legalistic set of rules calibrated to
sanctions ranging from yardage penalties to suspension or expul-
sion;50 disabling injuries are commonplace in football; 51 flare-ups and
fighting are not uncommon in the heat of passion during a game;52
the violence of football is carefully orchestrated. The court noted
that the coaches made a guided effort to build the emotional level of
players to "'controlled rage.' 53 One coach testified that the pre-
game psychological preparation should generate an emotion
equivalent to that which would be experienced by a father whose
family had been endangered by another driver who had attempted
to force the family car off the edge of a mountain road. The precise
pitch of motivation for the players at the beginning of the game
should be the feeling of that father when, after overtaking and
stopping the offending vehicle, he is about to open the door to take
revenge upon the person of the other driver.5
The court went on to analyze whether behavior on the playing
field in the business of professional football should become a subject
for the business of the courts. The court noted:
The [National Football League's] rules of play are so legalistic in
their statement and so difficult of application because of the speed
and violence of the play that the. differences between violations
which could fairly be called deliberate, reckless or outrageous and
those which are "fair play" would be so small and subjective as to
be incapable of articulation. 5
The court further noted that it would be extremely difficult to re-
solve causation questions since the number of collisions between
players are so frequent and forceful.56
The district court's analysis touches on many of the considera-
48. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
49. Id. at 354.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 355.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 358.
56. Id.
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tions that have been suggested for a multifactor duty analysis. The
court first examined its ability to penetrate deeply into the fine
points of football rules so that it could divine an appropriate stan-
dard of care for an alien world in which violence was the norm.57
The analogy to the dilemma of a court in a complex design defect
case seeking to establish a design standard against the background
of technological concepts that are foreign to the court is not strained.
In Hackbart, the problem is even more extreme. The court noted
that the written rules of football are not only difficult to understand,
but difficult to apply because of the speed and violence of the
game.58 Their application, the court said, "is often a matter of sub-
jective evaluation of the circumstances." 59 Thus, to be fair, a court
would have to freeze a moment in time and bring to bear the subjec-
tive evaluation of a referee to the issue. The Henderson argument
that this calls for managerial decisionmaking rather than judicial
decisionmaking ° seems particularly apt. When one adds the com-
plex causation problem to the football case, the justiciability of the
claim is put further in doubt. What would have happened to
Hackbart had Clark not battered him? A football player past age 35
is prone to disabling injuries. The blow that was delivered out of
anger or frustration could have just as easily been delivered in the
very next play on a legitimate tackle. Thus, the relationship between
the standard of care and causation is implicated in this type of
case.61 To make the case for causation with clarity, the standard of
legitimate player contact would have to be defined and determined to
be such that it would have avoided injury.
Finally, the harsh reality is that the players subjected them-
selves to the authority of another decisionmaking process-that of
the National Football League.62 The alternative decisionmaker was a
well respected body that had set standards and imposed sanctions for
their violation. I do not mean to imply that the NFL has the dele-
gated legislative authority of a governmental regulatory agency.
However, as a result of television and the media, football has become
a high visibility sport, and continued national approval of its general
57. Id. at 354-55.
58. Id. at 354.
59. Id.
60. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 4, at 469-77.
61. For a discussion of the relationship between standard of care and causation, see
Twerski, supra note 8, at 564.
62. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
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operation is certainly significant. The decision to forego judicial ex-
amination of individual conduct in a football game seems quite
correct.
In a similar vein, the refusal of courts to allow a cause of action
for educational malpractice is buttressed by a multiplicity of factors.
In these cases, plaintiffs have brought suit for the failure of school
systems to act reasonably in the discharge of their duty to educate
the student.63 Allegations have included improper testing, evaluation,
grading, and promotion. The politically charged nature of these
cases has clearly been a factor in the denial of a cause of action."
Nonetheless, the elements that have been discussed by the courts in-
dicate that they have recognized their own limitations and are pre-
pared to entrust educational decisions to responsible and responsive
governmental agencies.
In denying recovery, courts have expressed deep concern about
their ability to set standards that could meet with widespread socie-
tal approval. Thus, in Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dis-
trict,65 the court said:
Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or
cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with dif-
ferent and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be
taught, and any layman might-and commonly does-have his
own emphatic views on the subject. The "injury" claimed here is
plaintiff's inability to read and write. Substantial professional au-
thority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools, or its
failure, are influenced by a host of factors which affect the pupil
subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and beyond
the control of its ministers. They may be physical, neurological,
emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but not
63. E.g., Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941-42,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 718-19 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal.
App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Tubell v. Dade County Pub. Schools, 419 So. 2d 388
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982); Hunter
v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d
121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School
Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
64. See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982); Hoffman v.
Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375
(1979).
65. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
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perceived, recognized but not identified.66
This problem truly involves the court in polycentric decisionmaking.
If the problem is that Johnny can't read, then spending more time on
reading could lead to less time on mathematics or current events.
Should physical education be sacrificed for remedial reading or
should the funds be equally divided? A decision to increase educa-
tional intensity could meet with resistance at home because it would
adversely affect the child's ability to help care for siblings or earn
part-time money, which could in turn cause emotional stress, which
could in turn result in diminished academic performance.6 7 The cy-
cle is never ending. To this must be added the intractable problem of
establishing causation. If the standard is so difficult to evaluate, then
establishing what would have happened if the hypothetical standard
had been met is equally difficult.6 '
The courts also have emphasized the decisionmaking authority
of the boards of education and their high political visibility as a sig-
nificant reason for nonintervention in an educational malpractice
case." These boards, locally based and responsible to political pres-
sure, are not only delegated by law with the responsibility for educa-
tion, but also constitute a market of sorts for various educational
theories. The work product is, in a sense, open and obvious to par-
ents and guardians. Long range educational problems do not surface
overnight and there is an opportunity for parental involvement, as
well as very often an appeals process of sorts for decisions that are
unpalatable.
If courts are to be encouraged to perform the screening neces-
sary to prevent the law of torts from drowning in the reasonablefiess
standard, then there will be a continuing need in each area to articu-
late the special concerns that justify judicial abstinence. It will re-
66. Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61 (footnote omitted).
67. Although the courts have not identified this problem as involving polycentric deci-
sionmaking, they have given voice to this concern in more traditional verbiage-they have
noted that the multitudinous factors that affect the learning process make it impossible to
establish causation. See cases cited infra note 68.
68. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556
(Alaska 1981); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 487, 439 A.2d 582, 585 (1982);
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 445-46, 391 N.E.2d 1352,
1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring).
69. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 557
(Alaska 1981); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 487-88, 439 A.2d 582, 585-86 (1982);
Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125-27, 400 N.E.2d 317, 319-20, 424 N.Y.S.2d
376, 378-80 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 444-45,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354-55, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979).
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quire more then the broadside statement that declares that courts
ought to leave the area alone. Finely honed policy arguments, tied
specifically to the facts of the particular case, can make the differ-
ence in bringing about aggressive judicial control of tort law.
IV. SOMETHING BORROWED--POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Questions of judicial competence have also played a role in
cases that the United States Supreme Court has identified as
presenting nonjusticiable political questions."° In the seminal case of
Baker v. Carr,71 the Court set forth several factors that, if present,
would weigh in favor of an issue being held nonjusticiable.72 Two of
these considerations-"a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving [the question]" 'T7 and "the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion" 74-- reflect the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of its own institutional limitations.75
The cases of Coleman v. Miller,'7  Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.77 and Gilligan v. Mor-
gan78 present perhaps the clearest examples of instances in which the
Court has stressed a lack of institutional capacity.79 In Coleman, the
70. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 8, 10 (1973) (court would lack compe-
tence to formulate standards for composition and training of military units); Chicago & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (foreign policy determinations
by President involve factors beyond judicial competence to evaluate or review); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (court should not undertake to appraise political, social,
and economic conditions bearing on constitutional amendment process).
71. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. See Id. at 217.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The precise role that functional or prudential factors play in the political question
doctrine has not been clearly defined by the Court, and has been the subject of considerable
debate among commentators. It is beyond the scope of this article to expound upon or critique
the many positions that have been taken. For a review of the most prominent approaches in
this area, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-16 (1978).
76. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
77. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
78. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
79. This article does not purport to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the political
question doctrine. Certainly constitutional scholars will recognize that numerous other con-
cerns and constitutional nuances are implicated in the cases discussed here. However, the pres-
ence of institutional concerns has not escaped recognition by the leading commentators. For
example, Professor Scharpf relied on Coleman and Waterman S.S. in support of his functional
theory of the political question doctrine. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Ques-
tion: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 567-73 (1966). In essence, Scharpf argued
that the Court was justified in deferring to an alternative decisionmaker when it was called
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State of Kansas, which had rejected a proposed constitutional
amendment in 1924, ratified the same amendment in 1937.80 The
petitioners, members of the Kansas legislature who had opposed rati-
fication, argued that the amendment could not have been legiti-
mately enacted because it had not been passed within a "reasonable
time.""" Chief Justice Hughes, writing the opinion of the Court in
which two other Justices joined, stated that a determination as to
how much time an amendment should be afforded for ratification
required a consideration of factors that were not properly within the
purview of the judiciary.82 He wrote:
Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determina-
tion? None are to be found in Constitution or statute. . . . [There
are numerous matters which must be] examined and weighed.
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of eco-
nomic needs, it would be necessary, in determining whether a rea-
sonable time had elapsed since its submission, to consider the eco-
nomic conditions prevailing in the country, whether these had so
far changed since the submission as to make the proposal no longer
responsive to the conception which inspired it or whether conditions
were such as to intensify the feeling of need and the appropriate-
ness of the proposed remedial action. In short, the question of a
reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this case it does
involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, polit-
ical, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the
appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as
to which it would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority
to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with
respect to the validity of an amendment actually ratified.8 3
upon to assess or evaluate factual matters as to which another branch had "superior institu-
tional capacity." Id. at 570. Professor Henkin, in evaluating Gilligan, suggested that the
Court's recognition of judicial incompetence to supervise and evaluate military procedures may
have implicitly led it to conclude that the cause should be dismissed for "want of equity."
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 619-22 (1976). Henkin
would favor the employment of this doctrine when the nature of the remedy requested ren-
dered the Court unable to fashion adequate relief. See id. at 606-07, 619-20.
80. 307 U.S. at 435-36. The amendment at issue was the proposed Child Labor Amend-
ment, 46 Stat. 670 (1924).
81. 307 U.S. at 451-52.
82. Id. at 453-54. In Dillon v. Gloss; 256 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1921), the Court had de-
cided that Congress had the power to designate the mode of ratification of amendments. The
Court also held that the Constitution required that ratification "reflect the will of the people in
all sections [of the country] at relatively the same period." Id. at 375. The time set, said the
Court, should be "some reasonable time after the proposal." Id.
83. 307 U.S. at 453-54.
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The Court went on to say that while such matters were inappropri-
ate for judicial consideration, an alternative mechanism did exist for
their evaluation and solution:
[T]hese conditions are appropriate for the consideration of the po-
litical departments of the Government. The questions they involve
are essentially political and not justiciable. They can be decided by
the Congress with the full knowledge and appreciation ascribed to
the national legislature of the political, social and economic condi-
tions which have prevailed during the period since the submission
of the amendment.8'
Thus, the Court was particularly ill-at-ease when asked to delve into
matters that are, by their nature, amorphous and unquantifiable.
This discomfort was accentuated because of the existence of an al-
ternative decisionmaker that was better suited to the task.'
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.,85 the Court faced another judicial no man's land. The respon-
dent, a domestic air carrier, asked that a Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) decision not to grant it authorization to provide foreign air
transportation be overturned.8  The denial of the grant had received
express presidential approval as was required by statute.87 Although
review of CAB decisions was provided for in the Civil Aeronautics
Act,8 8 the Court declined to review such decisions when, as in this
instance, the President had approved the CAB's decision.89
The Court pointed to the fact that the presidential decision not
only hinged on foreign policy considerations, but required knowledge
of specialized information only the Chief Executive could reasonably
be expected to assay adequately. 90 In addition, the Court indicated
that even if it could obtain and assess the requisite information, the
nature of the decision to be made required a degree of discretion and
an analysis of factors that were inappropriate to the judiciary. Mr.
Justice Jackson wrote:
84. Id. at 454.
85. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
86. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 104-05. Another section of the Civil Aeronautics Act provided that all orders
of the CAB were reviewable in federal court. See Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, § 1006, 52
Stat. 1024 (1938) (repealed 1958). The current version of this statute removes from review all
orders that are subject to presidential approval. 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976).
88. Ch. 601, § 1006, 52 Stat. 1024 (1938) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976)).
See supra note 87.
89. 333 U.S. at 110-11.
90. Id. at 111.
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It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant informa-
tion, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive
taken on information properly held secret. . . . But even if courts
could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are
wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of
the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, com-
plex and involve large elements of prophecy. . . . They are deci-
sions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither the aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong
in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry.91
Coleman illustrates the problems the judiciary faces when it re-
alizes an informational deficit. The difficulty stems not from the vol-
ume of information to be considered, but from the nature of that
information. Political, social, and economic factors are fundamen-
tally amorphous and unquantifiable. Coleman suggests that when
courts stray into these fields they run a substantial risk of factual
error; any decision reached would of necessity be flawed because it
would rest on an unsteady base.
Like Coleman, Waterman Steamship focuses initially on infor-
mational difficulties. 2 Unlike Coleman, however, the information at
issue was not difficult to assess, but was inaccessible because of its
confidential nature.98 In addition, the Court noted that even if the
informational problems were resolved, the matter would still be non-
justiciable because of the nature of the decision involved, not the
nature of the facts upon which the decision would be based." The
decision of the President on such matters was inherently one that
was grounded in an exercise of discretion. On such a question, the
Court, even if considering the same facts available to the President,
could claim no better expertise than the Chief Executive in such
matters. In short, the Court may have felt that it could apply no
principle for guiding the Chief Executive to a better decision and
could set down no framework for the resolution of such an issue in
the future.
While Coleman focused on the bases of decision and Waterman
Steamship on the character of the decision itself, these factors both
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
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seem to be present in Gilligan v. Morgan.5 Gilligan presents an in-
teresting political question analogue to questions sometimes found in
design defect litigation. The respondents, students at Kent State
University in 1970, claimed that the Ohio National Guard violated
the students' rights of speech and assembly and otherwise acted
without legal justification during a violent campus disturbance in
May, 1970.98 The students asked that the Court undertake a "judi-
cial evaluation of the appropriateness of the 'training, weaponry and
orders' of the Ohio National Guard . . . [and] that the District
Court establish standards for the training, kind of weapons and
scope and kind of orders to control the actions of the National
Guard." 17 Further, the Court was asked to provide "[e]ontinued ju-
dicial surveillance to assure compliance with the changed
standards." 98
The Court held that it was beyond the capabilities of the judici-
ary to grant the relief sought. First, the Court said that information
relative to the design of a military unit was highly technical and
inconclusive, and thus beyond the judicial grasp:
[The respondents' request] would plainly and explicitly require a
judicial evaluation of a wide range of possibly dissimilar procedures
and policies approved by different law enforcement agencies or
other authorities; and the examples cited [by respondents] may re-
present only a fragment of the accumulated data and experience in
the various States, in the Armed Services, and in other concerned
agencies of the Federal Government. Trained professionals, subject
to the day-to-day control of the responsible civilian authorities, nec-
essarily must make comparative judgments on the merits as to
evolving methods of training, equipping, and controlling military
forces with respect to their duties under the Constitution. It would
be inappropriate for a district judge to undertake this responsibility
in the unlikely event that he possessed quite technical
competence. 99
95. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id. at 5-6.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 8. The majority based its decision, in part, on a constitutional delegation to a
coequal branch. Justice Blackmun, however, in a concurrence joined by Justice Powell, indi-
cated that he would hold the issue nonjusticiable solely on the ground of judicial incapacity.
He wrote:
This case relates to prospective relief in the form of judicial surveillance of highly
subjective and technical matters involving military training and command. As such,
it presents an "[inappropriate] . . . subject matter for judicial consideration," for
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In essence, the Gilligan Court was asked to correct a defect in the
design of the Ohio National Guard. The Court's difficulty in fulfil-
ling this request stemmed from a number of factors. First, the rele-
vant information was of a highly technical nature; the Court could
not assure itself that it would not commit factual error in evaluating
the evidence. Second, the Court acknowledged that even a party able
to assess the pertinent data would find it in large part subjective,
often contradictory, and hopelessly inconclusive. No expert could
state unequivocally that he had derived the appropriate standard
from such material. This being the case, the Court could not suggest
any definitive standards by which to adjudge the decisionmaker's
choices as erroneous. The best the Court could hope to do was to
replace the judgment of the professional planner with its own-to
exchange one unprincipled decision with another.
In sum, the Court in the political question area has identified
the following warning signals of nonjusticiability: (1) The informa-
tion needed for a decision is highly technical, elusive, or in some
other way inaccessible; (2) An evaluation of the requisite informa-
tion, even by a party that has the capability of making such an eval-
uation, does not yield substantive standards; (3) An alternative
mechanism exists that is in a better position to evaluate or resolve
the issue in question.100
It is clear that when the stakes are sufficiently high, courts are
capable of mustering the necessary introspection to assess their insti-
tutional infirmities and to evaluate the efficacy of other decisionmak-
ing modes. The selfsame political realities that have been of suffi-
cient intensity to trigger federal legislative proposals have brought to
the attention of the judiciary the severity of the problems encoun-
tered by the business community with products liability. Courts that
have had their justiciability consciousness raised could thus draw on
well-developed concepts in limiting the reasonableness standard.
That this is the preferred direction to be taken can only be seen by
comparing the judicial screening process with the proposals for legis-
respondents are asking the District Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, "to
enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are
lacking." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 226 (1962).
Id. at 14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. It is not germane here whether the Court employed these factors in determining
whether reference to an alternative decisionmaker was constitutionally mandated or whether
prudence so required. These cases have been highlighted merely to illustrate the types of insti-
tutional limitations by which courts, including the Supreme Court, feel they are or should be
bound.
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lative screening.
V. SOMETHING BLUE-LEGISLATIVE SCREENING
The product liability crisis has spawned legislative activity at
both the state and federal level.101 In another forum, I undertook a
detailed analysis of the proposed federal legislation. 0 2 I shall not re-
peat my critique at this time except to note that the federal legisla-
tion would, in my opinion, so complicate the law of products liability
that not only consumers but manufacturers will rue the day it was
passed. There is a place for sharply focused federal legislation that
addresses the most serious problems besetting the product liability
litigation system.103 But a complex product liability code that seeks
to legislate every aspect of the common law cause of action is beyond
anyone's drafting capabilities.110 The ambiguities will plague us for
decades to come.
The focus of my present concern is on the sections that seek to
provide a screening mechanism that will prevent unworthy risk-util-
ity cases from reaching juries. As noted earlier, I do not disagree
that screening must be accomplished.10 5 My suggested multifactor
duty analysis is directed toward that very goal.106 I do believe, how-
ever, that the screening that the proposed federal legislation seeks to
accomplish will drive significant policy analysis underground and
Balkanize risk-utility analysis.
Two sections of the most recent version of the Kasten bill1 07 ad-
dress the risk-utility standard. Section 5(b) of Senate Bill 44
provides:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation
if, at the earlier of the time of manufacture or Government certifi-
cation of the product, a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the
same or similar circumstances would not have used the design or
formulation that the manufacturer used. A product is not unrea-
101. See supra note 9.
102. Twerski, supra note 9.
103. For my suggestion for sensible product liability reform that would resolve some of
the most vexing issues facing the litigation system, see id. at 469-76.
104. It is interesting that the drafters of S. 44, Senate Bill, supra note 9, have sought to
accomplish in twenty-nine triple-spaced pages what it took the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965), in dealing with negligence liability, an entire volume to accomplish. That the
drafters did not succeed is not surprising. They simply attempted the impossible.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
106. Twerski, supra note 8.
107. Senate Bill, supra note 9.
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sonably dangerous in design or formulation unless-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge
which was reasonably accepted in the scientific, technical,
or medical community for the existence of the danger
which caused the claimant's harm, should have known
about the danger which allegedly caused the claimant's
harm; and
(2) a means to eliminate the danger that caused the
harm was within practical technological feasibility. 08
It.is the burden of the plaintiff under section 5(b)(2) to establish
that a means of eliminating the harm was technologically feasible. 109
Section 5(e) delimits the evidence that will be found accceptable to
establish the alternative design. It provides:
An alternative design or formulation is evidence that a product
was unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation only if the
claimant establishes that, at the time of the manufacture of the
product-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge
which was reasonably accepted in the scientific, technical,
or medical community for the existence of the alternative
design, should have known about the alternative design;
and
(2) the alternative design or formulation would
have-
(A) utilized only science and technology
which was reasonably accepted in the scientific,
technical, or medical community and which was
within practical technological feasibility;
(B) prevented the claimant's harm and pro-
vided equivalent or better overall safety than the
chosen design or formula. The overall safety of the
alternative design or formula is better than the
chosen design or formula if the hazards it elimi-
nates are greater than any new hazards it creates
for any persons and for any uses; and
(C) been desirable, functionally, economi-
cally, and otherwise, to the person who uses or
consumes it.110
108. Id. § 5(b).
109. Id. § 5(b)(2).
110. Id. § 5(e).
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A. Driving Policy Analysis Underground
The statutory sections set forth above specify provisions that
must be met by the plaintiff in order to establish a prima facie case
for defect. These provisions essentially codify risk-utility analysis but
require that the plaintiff prove each of the elements separately (more
about this later). What is important for this portion of the discussion
is that the proposed federal standards seek to control the abuse of
risk-utility analysis by looking to the risk-utility formula itself to
screen the unworthy cases out of the litigation system. This presup-
poses that the difficulties that have been encountered in product lia-
bility litigation can be attributed to the runaway use of risk-utility
analysis. My belief, however, is that the difficulty with products liti-
gation stems not from unbridled risk-utility analysis, but from the
occasional inappropriateness of utilizing the balancing process at
all."" In cases where readily identifiable policy concerns militate
against utilization of the negligence formula, defendants should be
exonerated from liability. This is how I have always understood the
function of tort no-duty rules.1"2 Thus, to look to the Learned Hand
formula 13 to accomplish the screening sets the entire process on its
head. These are not mere theoretical musings. Consider the
following.
1. Technological Feasibility.-Section 5(e)(2)(A) provides
that for an alternative design to be considered it must have "utilized
only science and technology which was reasonably accepted in the
scientific, technical, or medical community and which was within
practical technological feasibility." 14 In discussing the state of the
11l. Under my proposed analysis, the close-call risk-utility case would be diverted from
litigation if there were demonstrable institutional infirmities that would place in question the
ability of the court to fairly litigate the design, and alternative mechanisms existed that ad-
dressed the safety concerns. Although this necessarily calls for some understanding of the risk-
utility evidence, the cutting edge for screening is the non-risk-utility considerations.
112, Thus, no-duty rules have been rationalized as diverting from risk-utility litigation
those cases that for sound policy reasons should not be subjected to the negligence test. See,
e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 32, §§ 56, 58; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases
(pts. I & 2), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1033-45 (1928), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 255-56, 270-
75 (1929).
Some scholars rationalize no-duty rules based on risk-utility considerations. According to
their view, a no-duty rule does not operate to remove cases from the risk-utility arena, but
rather is a conclusion that is itself based on risk-utility principles. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra
note 1, §§ 6.7, 6.9; Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 872-73; Landes & Posner, Salvors,
Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 119-27 (1978).
113. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
114. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(e)(2)(A).
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art question as one of the factors to be utilized by the courts in a
multifactor duty analysis, I have noted that the question of whether
to apply negligence or strict liability in a particular case was only
one of the questions that courts must decide. 1 5 Indeed, it is the easi-
est one at that. If legislatures wish to eliminate strict liability they
need only mandate that for design and failure to warn cases, the
manufacturer's conduct is to be judged as of the time of manufac-
ture or sale."'
Much more difficult to control, however, are two other questions
that pass under the state of the art label. The first is the problem of
changing societal attitudes with regard to safety. There are real fair-
ness problems in litigating cases involving a design of ten or twenty
year vintage. The problem is not that technology has changed drasti-
cally. Most of the design changes for which plaintiffs clamor were
technologically feasible ten, twenty, and most probably, fifty years
ago. If they were not instituted, it was due to the fact that society
did not consider safety to be the burning issue that it has become
today.1 17 The proposed section does not address this real problem of
unfairness to manufacturers. It may be that courts, faced with cases
of antiquated designs, will utilize section 5(e)(2)(A) or that juries
instructed with regard to this section will bring in defense verdicts.
But it is unlikely that courts will grapple with the question honestly.
With Congress having spoken to the issue of technological feasibility,
the matter will come to rest. It is not likely that courts will utilize
their creative lawmaking powers to clarify the policy that they seek
to apply. Thus, either the real problem will remain with us or the
courts seeking to take into consideration the policy of not litigating
cases past the time that societal values have changed will end up
making their decisions in the jargon of technological feasibility.
A second problem that plagues the courts and often masquer-
ades under the state of the art-technogical feasibility label concerns
the weight to be given to uncorroborated expert testimony.1 18 It is
one of the world's worst kept secrets that expert testimony is often
the product of guesswork that bears little relation to the real world.
115. Twerski, supra note 8, at 556-61.
116. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(b) adopts a negligence standard that pinpoints the
time of manufacture as the time period for the exercise of risk-utility judgments. This aspect
of the legislation is, I believe, desirable. See Twerski, supra note 9, at 470-72.
117. See Henderson, supra note 23; Twerski, supra note 8, at 560.
118. See O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice
and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627 (1978); Twerski, supra note 8, at 556-57.
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An expert testifying about an alternative design may have done little
to support that testimony as to its practical feasibility. I have sug-
gested that in assessing the directed verdict potential, courts should
evaluate the strength of the expert testimony as one factor in its
decisionmaking process."" 9 Thus, expert testimony of a somewhat
questionable nature that might be sufficient to support a jury verdict
in a rather simple design case, should not be sufficient if the case
involved a complex polycentered design change.
Legislative attempts have offered little hope for the resolution of
this problem. An early version of the federal legislation contained a
section that sought to deal directly with expert testimony.12 0 That
section limited the rights of claimants so sharply12 1 that it was
dropped from the most recent version of the bill."22 The current bill
limits the court's focus to the issue of whether the plaintiff has
proven the practical technological feasibility of the design. By ignor-
ing any consideration of expert testimony, the proposed legislation
overlooks the fact that the issue often should not be whether the al-
ternative design is practical, but rather, whether such a decision can
be based on flimsy expert testimony.
The difficulty with legislating this topic is that the moment we
formulate the expert testimony issue as a make-or-break test for the
viability of a design defect case, we engage in massive overkill. The
alternative embodied in the proposed federal legislation will either
not address the problem at all, or will compel courts to mask their
policymaking with regard to expert testimony in the guise of deter-
minations of practical technological feasibility. Thus, decisionmaking
that otherwise would lead to well-articulated decisions with high
precedential value will be driven underground.
2. Polycentricity.-Perhaps the most potent argument for
screening design defect cases from the litigation system is the inabil-
ity of courts to replicate the design process undertaken by manufac-
119. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 556-58; Twerski, supra note 9, at 441-43.
120. In the original version of S. 2361, Product Liability Act, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REc. S6847-51 (daily ed. June 16, 1982), § 4(b) provided: "The claimant must intro-
duce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
make the determinations specified in subsection (a). Expert opinion is not considered sufficient
evidence to support a proposition of fact unless it is supported or corroborated by sound objec-
tive evidence." Id. at S6847.
121. See Twerski, supra note 9, at 441-43; 1982 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 14.
122. S. 2631 was reported to the Senate with amendments in the nature of a substitute.
128 CONG. REc. S13,674 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1982). The amended S. 2631 is identical to S. 44.
129 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of Sen. Kasten).
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turers. 123 The contention that this multifaceted and interconnected
process is not fit for judicial determination is most persuasive when
an alternative design suggested by the plaintiff would significantly
alter the design of the product.12 The court would then become en-
meshed in managerial decisionmaking of a high order.
The standards that the federal legislation establishes for the ad-
missibility of evidence of an alternative design addresses this prob-
lem only tangentially. Admittedly, the rule-oriented approach of sec-
tion 5(e) will have some tendency to prevent polycentric cases from
reaching juries. It is, however, quite possible for even highly polycen-
tric cases to meet the standards set forth in the statute. The problem
with the statute is that it does not directly address the polycentricity
issue. It could not do so. The proposition that courts ought to be
wary of indulging in managerial decisionmaking is not a fit topic for
legislation. It is a matter to be directed to a court in its lawmaking
role.
Even if one were to grant that the most extreme polycentric
cases would be screened out by the legislative standard, a court
could not weigh polycentricity together with other factors in deciding
to direct a verdict for the defendant in cases where polycentricity is
present but not in its most extreme form.12 5 The legislative scheme
does not provide for considering a broad range of policies in directed
verdict practice. Instead, it proceeds on the assumption that sharply
focused and limited findings on the isolated factors of risk-utility
analysis will do the job. For those who have argued so valiantly over
the years that courts should face up to their institutional limitations,
the federal legislation sacrifices far too much. One can only expect
that the policy grounds for decisions will be driven underground.
Courts will, from time to time, note that the plaintiff has not made
out one or another of the various elements of the federal cause of
action. It will have little relation, however, to the real reason for the
decision. This masking of the true issue will prevent courts from con-
fronting the polycentricity issue in all but perhaps the most extreme
case.
123. Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 4; Henderson, Ex-
panding the Negligence Concept, supra note 4.
124. See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Twer-
ski, supra note 8, at 580, 594; Note, Judicial Participation in the Establishment of Vehicle
Safety Standards: A System in Need of Reform, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 902 (1981).
125. See supra note 14.
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3. Market Factors.-Among the considerations that I have
contended a court should evaluate in deciding to direct a verdict is
the extent to which the market was competitive and provided real
choices to consumers.126 In a free market economy, the market can
provide substantial guidance as to the desired standard of product
safety. The factors test embodied in federal legislation touches upon
some of these market factors.127 However, it focuses on them nar-
rowly as part of risk-utility analysis. There is no attempt to assess
the factors in a broader perspective, which I believe is necessary in
order to give them the force of significant public policy. Once again,
the legislation will cause important policy decisions to be masked in
the garb of relatively insignificant fact-finding.
B. The Balkanization of Risk-Utility Analysis
The essence of risk-utility analysis is the balancing and weigh-
ing of various considerations so that a composite judgment can be
made as to whether the product as designed embodied "excessive
preventable danger."128 The federal legislation that sets standards
for design litigation seeks to control the judgmental process by frac-
tionalizing risk-utility analysis. For example, section 5(b), 1 9 at first
blush, appears to be nothing more than a reformulation of the negli-
gence formula. But, there is a vast difference between the negligence
calculus and the legislative prescription. To make out the prima fa-
cie legislative case, a plaintiff must establish each element of the
126. The scope of consumer choice and the open and obvious nature of the danger relate
to market concerns. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 556-74. Professor Henderson has expressed
concern that the market choice factor is difficult to deal with at the trial level. He asks
whether evidence on consumer choice would be presented to the jury as relevant to the reason-
ableness issue or whether the jury would be excused from hearing such evidence. Henderson,
supra note 30, at 856-57. 1 do not, however, propose radical restructuring of design defect
litigation. Much of the evidence of competition will be relevant to the reasonableness issue.
Some of it will be judicially noticed by the court. It does not, for example, take a particularly
astute observer to note the wide range of choices available to consumers in the automotive
market. There is no need for a judge to close his eyes to realities. The judge, prior to a motion
for a directed verdict, may also invite the presentation of available published literature to help
inform the court on this matter.
127. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(e)(2)(A) addresses "practical technological feasibil-
ity," which demands under § 2(8) that economic feasibility of the alternative design be estab-
lished. The market choices are, of course, relevant to the issue of economic feasibility.
128. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978);
Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Knitz v. Minister Mach.
Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 466, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982).
129. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(b).
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formula on its own.13 0 What does this mean in practical terms? Con-
sider the amount of knowledge to be charged to a defendant. A de-
fendant is not to be held liable unless "the manufacturer knew or,
based on knowledge which was reasonably accepted in the scientific,
technical, or medical community. . . , should have known about the
danger .... 131 The issue given to a jury is not whether the defen-
dant acted reasonably given the knowledge that he had or should
have had, but whether the knowledge was reasonably accepted in the
scientific, technical, or medical community. It is clear, however, that
the state of knowledge in the technological community is only one
factor in deciding the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. A
risk may be remote and not well established scientifically. If, how-
ever, there are good alternatives to the product that avoid the risk
entirely, there is no good reason to submit the plaintiff to even a
relatively small risk.132 Furthermore, the risk may be remote, but if
it should occur, the gravity of the harm may be great. Under risk-
utility balancing, such a product could be declared unreasonably
dangerous. The statutory definition eviscerates the trade-off process
and substitutes a "layered analysis" that asks questions that do not
squarely face the negligence issue.133 Admittedly, scientific accepta-
130. Id.
131. Id. § 5(b)(1).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 comments b & c (1965).
133. The wonderfully descriptive term "layered analysis" is taken from Henderson, Ex-
panding the Negligence Concept, supra note 4, at 521 n.203. He utilizes it to describe the
numerous exceptions to the rigid no-duty rules. These exceptions create a liability posture if,
but only if, each of a set of formal requisites is established. Thus, for example, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965), dealing with child trespassers, creates such a layered
analysis. It provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows
or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize
the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made danger-
ous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
Only if a claimant makes out each of the provisions (a)-(e) would the exception to the no-
trespasser recovery rule be established. See, e.g., Goll v. Muscara, 211 Pa. Super. 93, 235 A.2d
443 (1967).
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bility is one element to be considered in determining negligence, but
it cannot be the sole determinant. By splitting the negligence
formula asunder, the legislation screens indiscriminately; it takes no
account of the overall balance.
Similarly, section 5(e)(2)13 1 improperly requires that each of its
elements be made out separately. Thus, for example, the require-
ment in 5(e)(2)(C) that the alternative design must have "been de-
sirable, functionally, economically, and otherwise, to the person who
uses or consumes it," a1 3 5 makes no sense unless it is part of a balanc-
ing process. To speak of the alternative design being functionally and
economically desirable has little meaning unless we are to take into
account the counterweight of safety. It will be the rare instance that
some trade-off in favor of safety will not require some sacrifice with
regard to function or cost. 3 '
In short, to utilize the risk-utility test to screen against the risk-
utility test sacrifices both high policy and the innate good sense be-
hind the risk-utility balancing formula. Furthermore, there remains
a real question as to what value there is in throwing these very spe-
cific questions to the jury. It would seem that the reason for sending
a negligence case to the jury is to tap the jury's sense of what is
reasonable. It is a holistic judgment that is sought. There is consider-
able controversy about even informing the jury about risk-utility bal-
ancing. Some argue that these factors are best considered by a judge
in making his directed verdict decision.1 37 However, even those who
believe that the jury should be given the factors and told that they
are to weigh and balance them, submit the final decision to the jury's
discretion.1 38 Under the layered analysis, the jury is given a set of
discrete questions, each of which has meaning only when considered
together with the others, and is told to vote yea or nay. One may
wonder, why bother with the jury at all? Perhaps I am mistaken and
the discrete questions posed by the legislation are not for the jury,
This form of analysis prevents the total judgment from being made in a holistic fashion. It
is this model that the federal legislation emulates.
134. Senate Bill, supra note 9, § 5(e)(2).
135. Id. § 5(e)(2)(C).
136. For a full discussion of this aspect of the legislation, see Twerski, supra note 9, at
431-37.
137. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026
(1978); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Lia-
bility Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1303, 1308 n.29 (1974); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 840 (1973).
138. Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal Rptr. 225 (1978).
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but for the judge alone to utilize for the purposes of screening out
unworthy design defect cases. If this is so, and we are addressing the
trial judge, then I submit that the issues that should be considered in
directing a verdict need not be limited to the risk-utility factors.
Judges can make policy that transcends the negligence formula. And
they should not be encouraged to focus on a factors test which Bal-
kanizes the balancing process and robs it of meaning.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF SCREENING-THE CONSUMER
EXPECTATION TEST
The consumer expectation test is the stepchild of modern prod-
uct liability law. The rich literature, which otherwise has so ably
blanketed the field, has paid it scant attention. 139 With some notable
exceptions,'140 scholars have not paid much heed to the continued in-
sistence of numerous courts to predicate liability, in whole or in part,
on the failure of a product to meet consumer expectations. 41
There is a broad-based consensus among courts that in most
cases risk-utility analysis must be utilized to establish the standard
of product quality. 42 In balancing risk-utility factors, some consider-
139. The major thrust of the recent literature on products liability has been directed
toward risk-utility analysis. For a list of such literature, see Twerski, supra note 8, at 521 n.l.
140. See generally R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 69-71 (1980);
Bernacchi, A Behavioral Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance of
Analyzing Product Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U.
CIN. L. REV. 43 (1978); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REV. 465 (1978); Montgom-
ery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defec-
tive Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 812-24 (1976); Rheingold, What are the Consumer's
"Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAw. 589 (1967); Shapo, A Representational Theory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment,
60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
141. The following cases illustrate the diversity of jurisdictions that have expressed their
liability standard, either in whole or in part, in consumer expectation terms: Bruce v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871
(Alaska 1979); Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1978);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Aller
v. Rodgers Mach. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan.
643, 641 P.2d 353 (1982); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d
140 (1979); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Menard v. Newhall,
135 Vt. 53, 373 A.2d 505 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542
P.2d 774 (1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d
326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
142. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid mem. sub
nom. Yoder Co. v. General Cooper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39
19831
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
ation must be given to the likelihood of injury.143 What a consumer
will expect in product performance is certainly an important element
in determining whether the product is likely to cause harm. If a
product portrays itself as safer than it really is, the consumer may be
tempted to put it to uses that may be beyond its performance capac-
ity, triggering a serious injury. There is no way to escape the con-
sumer expectation perspective in establishing a standard for
defect.144
The more significant question is not whether consumer expecta-
tions must be factored into the risk-utility equation that sets the
product safety standard, but rather whether consumer expectations
alone create a standard for establishing defect. Is it ever possible to
bypass risk-utility analysis entirely and establish defect on the
grounds that a product failed to meet certain minimum expecta-
tions? If so, how are these expectations to be identified so that they
can serve as a guide for the court and jury?
These questions must be addressed without equivocation if the
consumer expectation test is to achieve independent status as a test
for defect. I shall argue that, with proper definition and appropriate
limitation, there is a role for a consumer expectation test that oper-
ates independently from risk-utility analysis. It is possible to con-
struct a test that will screen out illegitimate and ill-founded con-
sumer expectation cases-thus eliminating the fear that the test is so
subjective that it is, in a sense, lawless. The task of weeding out the
unworthy consumer expectation cases must fall to the court. Only a
court, capable of evaluating the underlying purposes behind the con-
sumer expectation test and the alternative modes of decision availa-
ble should the test be deemed inappropriate, can judge whether a
given fact pattern warrants its application.
There can be no doubt that a test that operates independently
from risk-utility balancing smacks of true strict liability.14 5 One can
readily understand the reluctance of some to embrace such an appar-
ently harsh standard for liability.146 I shall demonstrate, however,
N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 382
Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 comment b (1965).
144. A product that sits dormant in a corner can do no harm. It is only when one consid-
ers its uses by consumers that risk levels can be intelligently addressed.
145. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L.
REv. 293, 301 (1979).
146. See Keeton, supra note 145, at 302-03.
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that, properly understood, the consumer expectation test is neither
frightening nor harsh. It is, instead, a sophisticated and delicate tool
that can focus attention on the impact of marketing on product
safety.
A. Consumer Expectations-The Madison Avenue Tort
Many reasons have been set forth for the creation of a test for
defect based on consumer expectations. Some have expressed dissat-
isfaction with the high level of subjectivity of risk-utility balancing
and its use by opponents of product and environmental safety to le-
gitimize ultraconservative positions. 47 Others have been disturbed
by the use of a formula for liability that elevates economic efficiency
over such important human values as protecting the justified expec-
tations of consumers. 148 Case law, however, seems more concerned
with developing a test that responds to product image as the stan-
dard for liability.149 I have long believed that product liability
problems stem, in large part, from the inability of American technol-
ogy to keep pace with Madison Avenue. The need for the consumer
expectation test arose because no clearly defined tort or contract con-
cept was readily available to address the reality that consumer be-
havior is significantly influenced by product image.
At first blush, one might expect that the express warranty the-
ory might adequately address product image and the consumer ex-
pectations that such image creates. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, a seller is liable when it expressly warrants its product.150
147. See, e.g., Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The Cop-Out of Government Regu-
lation, 14 TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 43. Cf. Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law:.
Introduction and Perspective, 45 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 901 (1977) (risk-utility balancing may
also be inappropriate in context of public policy decisionmaking).
148. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 140.
149. See cases cited supra note 141.
150. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention
to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a state-
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There is considerable controversy as to how definite the state-
ment must be to constitute an express warranty. The question of
which kinds of statements are puffing and constitute only "the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods" and which statements
cross over the line and constitute a warranty has baffled courts for
decades. 151 It is clear, though, that the language of most advertise-
ments is not definite enough to constitute an express warranty. 152
The consumer expectation test focuses less on the quality of the
seller's representation and more on the sense impressions that flow to
the consumer as to how the product will perform. These impressions
may be created by the aura of the product as portrayed by advertise-
ments, the product's self-image, the uses to which consumers have
put the product in the past, and many similar intangible factors,
which altogether create product image.1 53 Under traditional contract
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does
not create a warranty.
151. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-3 (2d ed. 1980); Shapo, supra note 139, at 1186-91.
152. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966); Keating V*.
DeArment, 193 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963); Denna v. Chrysler Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d
582, 206 N.E.2d 221 (1964). But see Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.
1957); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
153. For a full development of the thesis demonstrating how the various forms of con-
sumer expectations relate to the concept of product defect, see Shapo, supra note 140, at 1334-
68. Shapo has stated his thesis as follows:
Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should center initially
and principally on the portrayal of the product which is made, caused to be made or
permitted by the seller. This portrayal should be viewed in the context of the im-
pression reasonably received by the consumer from representations or other commu-
nications made to him about the product by various means: through advertising, by
the appearance of the product, and by the other ways in which the product projects
an image on the mind of the consumer, including impressions created by widespread
social agreement about the product's function. This judgment should take into con-
sideration the result objectively determinable to have been sought by the seller, and
the seller's apparent motivation in making or permitting the representation or
communication.
These determinations of liability should consider, generally, the integrated image of
the product against the background of the public communications that relate to it;
and should refer, specifically, to those communications concerning the characteris-
tics or features of the product principally related to the element of disappointment,
and to the question of whether these characteristics or features reasonably might
have aroused conflict with respect to the decision to buy or otherwise to encounter
the product.
Id. at 1370. He suggests that the following factors are relevant in establishing a consumer tort:
1. The nature of the product as a vehicle for creation of persuasive advertising
images, and the relationship of this factor to the ability of sellers to generate prod-
uct representations in mass media;
[Vol. 11:861
JUDICIAL SCREENING
law, such soft product expectations would not support a finding of
express warranty.154 They are, however, the stuff that gives content
2. The specificity of representations and other communications related to the
product;
3. The intelligence and knowledge of consumers generally and of the disap-
pointed consumer in particular;
4. The use of sales appeals based on specific consumer characteristics;
5. The consumer's actions during his encounter with the product, evaluated in
the context of his general knowledge and intelligence and of his actual knowledge
about the product or that which reasonably could be ascribed to him;
6. The implications of the proposed decision for public health and safety gener-
ally, and especially for social programs that provide coverage for accidental injury
and personal disability;
7. The incentives that the proposed decision would provide to make the product
safer;
8. The cost to the producer and other sellers of acquiring the relevant informa-
tion about the crucial product characteristic and the cost of supplying it to persons
in the position of the disappointed party;
9. The availability of the relevant information about the crucial product char-
acteristic to persons in the position of the disappointed party and the cost to them of
acquiring it;
10. The effects of the proposed decision on the availability of data that bear on
consumer choice of goods and services;
11. Generally, the likely effects on prices and quantities of goods sold;
12. The costs and benefits attendant to determination of the legal issues in-
volved, either by private litigation or by collective social judgment;
13. The effects of the proposed decision on wealth distribution, both between
sellers and consumers and among sellers.
Id. at 1370-71. Although courts have taken notice of the Shapo thesis, see, e.g., Conder v. Hull
Lift Truck, Inc., 76 Ind. App. 381, 405 N.E.2d 538 (1980), vacated, - Ind. -, 435 N.E.2d 10
(1982); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979), it has yet to be
adopted as a unifying theme for the entirety of products liability law.
The thesis of this paper is much narrower. For better or for worse, courts continue to
utilize consumer expectations as an independent basis of liability. They have not integrated it
into their overall theoretical framework as Shapo has suggested they do in his landmark work.
If there is to be a consumer expectation liability test, it must be narrowly focused and judi-
cially circumscribed or it will be hopelessly subjective and lacking in credibility.
154. See cases cited supra note 152. As noted earlier, Professor Shapo is willing to take
soft consumer expectations into account in formulating his consumer test. See supra note 153.
It is clear that Professor Gary Schwartz would take issue with the attempt to find a consumer
expectation cause of action that fell short of express warranty. In Schwartz, Foreword: Under-
standing Products Liability, 67 CALIp. L. REV. 435 (1979), he disagrees with the Shapo the-
sis. He notes that
[t]he thesis works well if the "portrayal" is concrete enough to entail a U.C.C.
express warranty or a Restatement product representation. Absent this concreteness,
the thesis does not easily test out. Consider, for example, the advertisements of Dat-
sun automobiles, advertisements that have always praised the car for both economy
and quality, but with varying emphases. For several years, this advertising stressed
economy through the slogan, "Datsun Saves." After a well-publicized change of
advertising agencies, in 1977-78 Datsun's message became "We Are Driven," sug-
gesting quality and performance. With inventories swelling in dealers' lots in fall
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to the consumer expectation test.
It is questionable whether it is proper to give legal standing to a
consumer expectation test that would clearly be inadequate to sup-
port a finding of express warranty. If the drafters of the U.C.C.,
after careful deliberation, decided that only consumer expectations
created by express representations of the seller should be actionable,
it seems incorrect to create and give legal cognizance to a test based
on soft consumer expectations.
There are, however, two justifications for such an approach. The
first is that the entire law of strict products liability in torts has de-
veloped independently of the Uniform Commercial Code.155 Al-
though some courts continue to cling to the Code as the source of
authority for strict products liability,15 the vast majority have aban-
doned the Code and have substituted a clear tort perspective. 157 Ad-
mittedly, this approach may be more difficult with regard to the con-
sumer expectation test because it is so heavily based on the rubric of
warranty law. Nonetheless, courts have demonstrated a willingness
to create tort concepts for products liability law and to abandon the
excess baggage of the U.C.C.
The second justification for the independent development of the
consumer expectation test is based on a realistic analysis of how con-
sumer expectations are to be defined. The most pronounced criticism
1978, its advertising shifted to "We Are Dealing," pointing to temporary low prices.
To my mind, these changes in advertising themes, conspicuous though they are, do
not justify a legal rule that measures Datsun's personal injury liability to its 1976
purchasers by standards less demanding than those applicable to its 1977-78 pur-
chasers. Nor should Datsun's liability differ in any material respect from Toyota's
("if You Can Find a Better-Built Small Car, Buy It").
Id. at 476 n.241. A more difficult case in which to test the Schwartz approach would be
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981). See infra
text accompanying notes 207-13.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965). The vast ma-
jority of courts have bypassed the U.C.C. for the tort cause of action. See, e.g., Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Whether the section 402A development impermissibily invaded an
area legislatively covered by the U.C.C. has been the subject of acrimonious debate. See Dick-
erson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the Judge's Monument be Moved to a
Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974); Shanker, A Case of Judicial Chutzpah (The
Judicial Adoption of Strict Tort Products Liability Theory), 11 AKRON L. REV. 697 (1978);
Wade, Is Section 402A of the'Second Restatement of Tort Preempted by the UCC and There-
fore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974).
156, See, e.g., Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980); Swartz v.
General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 588, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978).
157. See authorities cited supra note 155.
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of the consumer expectation test is that it is difficult to pinpoint just
what those expectations are with regard to any given product.158 In
the following sections, a more precise method for defining consumer
expectations will be set forth.159 Utilizing this more precise defini-
tion, it will be evident that when properly applied, the consumer ex-
pectation test should not be deemed in conflict with the principles of
the law of express warranty. The common law has by its creativity
filled a void not addressed at all by the Code, rather than set itself in
opposition to a clear legislative mandate.
Furthermore, if classic representational theories are inadequate
to deal with soft representations, it must be understood that risk-
utility theory cannot adequately address the problem either. As
noted earlier, risk-utility analysis permits consideration of product
image within the overall balancing process;x6° consumer expectations
are relevant to the foreseeable risk level inherent in product use. But
product image swallowed into the overall risk-utility formula blunts
the sharp edge of the argument that manufacturers should not es-
cape liability for failing to meet consumer expectations.
B. Defining the Consumer Expectation Test
The consumer expectation test of defect has been phrased in
terms of what ordinary consumers actually expect in terms of prod-
uct performance.161 This definition of the test has created a straw
man of sorts, since it is clear that it provides no standard for deter-
mining just what a consumer's legitimate expectations are. Thus, the
drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act" 2 refused to
include the consumer expectation test in their definition of defect.
They stated: "The consumer expectation test takes subjectivity to its
most extreme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a different
understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Moreover, most
consumers are not familiar with the details of the manufacturing
process and cannot abstractly evaluate conscious design
158. See MUPLA, supra note 9, §104(B) analysis; Montgomery & Owen, supra note
140, at 823; Schwartz, supra note 154, at 475-81; Wade, supra note 137, at 829.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 161-84.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
161. E.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975);
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d
794 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A comment i (1965). But see Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A
Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1203-06 (1976).
162. MUPLA, supra note 9.
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alternatives."' 1 3
This perceived weakness with the consumer expectation test led
the Texas Supreme Court to reject its earlier position that partially
defined defect in terms of consumer expectations. In Turner v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.,6 " the court eliminated the consumer expectation
test from its definition of defect, stating: "We are persuaded to this
conclusion by the inconclusiveness of the idea that jurors would
know what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or
use of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or
test outside that of their own experiences and expectations. ' " 5
There is considerable merit to the argument that such an open-
ended test for defect is an invitation to jury lawlessness. If defect
were measured by each jury's subjective assessment of what consum-
ers expect, there would be no rational way to limit design defect liti-
gation. How could a court ever direct a verdict for a defendant? To
do so would require a judgment that no jury could find that consum-
ers would expect the product to cause injury in a particular use con-
text. It would be a rare case indeed that would qualify for a directed
verdict if the standard were based on the assumed expectations of
the ordinary consumer. 8
There is, however, a more reasonable and pragmatic interpreta-
tion of the consumer expectation test. Every product has core uses
that define the essence of the product. When a product is employed
163. Id. § 104 analysis.
164. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
165. Id. at 851. See also Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 657, 641 P.2d 353,
363 (1982) (Prager, J., dissenting).
166. At first glance, this appears to be a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The
criticisms hurled between the risk-utility theorists and the consumer expectation proponents
may lead one to wonder which school of thought is entitled to cast the first stone. The reader
will recall that one justification proferred for employing a consumer expectation test was the
subjective nature of risk-utility analysis. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. However,
the implications of the subjectivity inherent in the two tests may differ. Risk-utility analysis is
subjective in that the weight afforded the variables in the overall equation may differ from jury
to jury. The variables themselves, though, remain constant. The consumer expectation ap-
proach turns on a finding of a specific consumer expectation, which may vary according to the
subjective perceptions of each trier of fact. Thus, risk-utility has an element of subjectivity in
its balancing process; in consumer expectations, the very facts on which the process relies are
tainted with subjectivity.
It is not so clear that risk-utility has the better argument. After all, if the problem with
subjectivity is that it impairs the consistency and predictability of outcomes in products cases,
its existence in the process stage can be as damaging as in the data stage. In addition, I have
pointed out that any risk-utility balancing must also factor consumer expectations into the
equation. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44. Even risk-utility, then, suffers from some
subjectivity in the data stage.
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in a core use, and causes injury, there is an element of shock or
surprise attendant to the event, i.e., disappointed consumer expecta-
tions. For example, if a new tire blows out while being driven on the
highway at fifty miles per hour or if the steering mechanism fails on
a car that had never been tampered with, the plaintiff should be able
to establish a cause of action without having to counter an argument
that either the production or the design of the car was reasonable
under risk-utility analysis.1 67
167. There appears to be widespread agreement among commentators that a product
that causes injury when put to its core uses should be the subject of liability without the
necessity of establishing fault. Professor Henderson agrees that these cases, which he denomi-
nates "inadvertent design errors," do not call for the utilization of a risk-utility test to establish
a design standard. Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 4, at 1550-52. It
is not clear, though, that Henderson would totally embrace the views espoused in this article.
In discussing inadvertent design errors, he notes:
The feature of paramount importance shared by all these cases is the degree to
which they allow or, in fact, require the courts to delegate the task of establishing
applicable safety standards to the collective managerial authority of the engineering
community. If the plaintiff can prove that conformance by the defendant manufac-
turer to customary engineering practices would have prevented the product failure,
the defendant is liable for the harm caused. From the self-defeating nature of the
design defect in such a case, there is no further evaluative task required of the court
beyond a determination that the design itself caused the product to fail during its
intended use. In effect, the intended design serves as a standard with which to assess
(and almost automatically condemn) the actual design.
Id. at 1551-52 (footnote omitted). It would appear that Henderson would require proof that
the product failed to conform with customary engineering practices, though he does note that
the intended use standard "almost automatically" condemns the actual design. Under my pro-
posal, the failure of a product to meet core-use norms would impose liability. I am also uncer-
tain as to whether Henderson would agree with my position that firm consumer expectations
should be brought under the intended use umbrella. The question of whether the manufac-
turer's intentions should govern is an important one. Under the thesis suggested herein, firm
consumer expectations, whatever their source, would set the performance standard for the
product. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 140, at 81 n.24 (drawing similar distinction between
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
and Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)).
Professor Richard Epstein supports a representational theory that would impose strict lia-
bility for products that fail to meet clear performance standards. See id. at 69-71. What Ep-
stein calls the "strong design defect" case is very similar to the core-use concept suggested
herein. Epstein would apparently include cases that rest upon the "defendant's express or im-
plicit representation about his product's design and performance." Id. at 69. He suggests that
in the fuzzy no man's land in which express warranty has not been made out, there is room for
jury decisionmaking as to the meaning of the representation. Id. at 70-71. For an incisive
analysis of the Epstein thesis, see Britain, Book Review, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 627 (1982).
Britain suggests that once one leaves the domain of the explicit or express warranty, the litiga-
tion management problems are every bit as complex as they are with risk-utility theory, which
Epstein deprecates. See id. at 629-30 & n.38. If Britain is correct in characterizing Epstein's
representational theory as extending to consumer impressions from advertising or product ap-
pearance, then Epstein's position would be very close to that which I am espousing.
Professor Gary Schwartz grudgingly admits that in what he calls the "easy case," the
1983]
HOFSTRA LAW RE VIEW
If the consumer expectation test is, in truth, a strict liability test
for product failure in normal use, the question arises whether this is
any different than applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to a
products liability claim.168 The res ipsa doctrine permits the plaintiff
to establish a cause of action when the inference can be drawn that
the product would not have failed in the absence of defect.169 Many
cases that adopt the consumer expectation test seem to discuss its
utility in terms of proof of defect. In Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.,170 the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed the prevailing
view that design defect litigation requires risk-utility analysis. The
court noted:
The reasoning of these authorities is that in a design defect case
the standard of defectiveness under § 402A, involving as it does the
element of unreasonable danger, still requires a weighing of the
utility of risk inherent in the design against the magnitude of the
risk. However, there are those kinds of conditions which, whether
caused by design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a
reasonable risk. For example, the steering mechanism of a new au-
tomobile should not cause the car to swerve off the road; the drive
shaft of a new automobile should not separate from the vehicle
when it is driven in a normal manner; the brakes of a new automo-
bile should not suddenly fail; and the accelerator of a new automo-
bile should not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly
to accelerate. Conditions like these, even if resulting from the de-
sign of the products, are defective and unreasonably dangerous
without the necessity of weighing and balancing the various factors
involved.171
The California Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering
consumer expectation test makes sense. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 481. He contends,
however, that when consumer expectations have not been met, the case is fundamentally based
on failure to warn grounds. It is thus not necessary to resort to a consumer expectation stan-
dard-more traditional theory will serve the purpose. For a rebuttal to this argument, see infra
text accompanying notes 231-32. One should also consider that Schwartz differs from my posi-
tion in that he would give no weight to expectations that do not stem from the manufacturer or
that are less explicit than express warranty.
168. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d
426 (1971).
169. Res ipsa, in the products liability context, differs from the classic res ipsa applica-
tion in negligence cases, in that the defect concept replaces that of negligence. Instead of
drawing the inference that negligence was responsible for the harm, one draws the inference
that defect was responsible. This eliminates the need to draw the additional conclusion that the
defect was caused by negligent behavior.
170. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
171. Id. at 345-46, 363 A.2d 959 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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Co., Inc.,17 2 was even more explicit in drawing the connection be-
tween the consumer expectation test and proof of defect. The Cali-
fornia court first established that the consumer expectation test was
based, in part, on implied warranty grounds.173 It then stated:
As we noted in Greenman, "implicit in [a product's] presence on
the market . . . [is] a representation that it [will] safely do the
jobs for which it was built." When a product fails to satisfy such
ordinary consumer expectations as to safety in its intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable operation, a manufacturer is strictly liable for
resulting injuries. Under this standard, an injured plaintiff will fre-
quently be able to demonstrate the defectiveness of a product by
resort to circumstantial evidence, even when the accident itself pre-
cludes identification of the specific defect at fault. 174
A similar view was espoused by the Oregon court in Heaton v.
Ford Motor Co.,17 5 when the court noted:
In the type of case in which there is no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, available to prove exactly what sort of manufactur-
ing flaw existed, or exactly how the design was deficient, the plain-
tiff may nonetheless be able to establish his right to recover, by
proving that the product did not perform in keeping with the rea-
sonable expectations of the user.176
If the issue is proof of defect, as these cases imply, there would
appear to be no reason to create a separate test for liability. Under
such an approach, we could continue with risk-utility analysis as the
liability standard, but use the res ipsa theory to make out a prima
facie case for the plaintiff. Although, in many instances, it would
make little difference if we approach the case from a proof vantage
point rather than employ a new strict liability theory, it is important
to appreciate the tactical difference between a res ipsa approach and
a normal use-strict liability theory. Under res ipsa, the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case by setting forth the facts of the inci-
dent and alleging the inference that such an accident would not oc-
cur in the absence of defect. 77 The defendant is then permitted to
172. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
173. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
174. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (brackets in original) (citations
omitted).
175. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
176. Id. at 471-72, 435 P.2d at 808 (footnotes omitted).
177. See Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426
(1971).
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rebut the inference of defect using any relevant evidence. This is
often done by suggesting alternative causes for the accident.1 8 How-
ever, the defendant would certainly be permitted to introduce risk-
utility evidence to demonstrate that there was no design defect that
could have been responsible for the harm. To bolster his case, the
plaintiff would be required to rebut by introducing contrary expert
evidence to support his general inference of defect. It is clear that
such an approach involves the plaintiff in expensive and lengthy
litigation.
If, instead, the plaintiff could recover on a strict liability theory
grounded on the doctrine that when a product fails in normal use,
liability attaches because it disappoints consumer expectations, there
would be no rebuttal on the basis of risk-utility evidence. Liability
would be fully established by demonstrating that the product failed
in normal use and that neither the plaintiff nor a third party was
responsible for tampering that could have introduced the defect into
the product. Any attempt by the defendant to introduce risk-utility
evidence would be rejected since the operative theory is the failure of
the product to meet consumer expectations when the product fails in
a normal use context.1 79
Recasting the consumer expectation test into a test of strict lia-
bility for products that fail in normal use answers many of the criti-
cisms leveled at the consumer expectation test. A perceived fault
with the consumer expectation test is that it appears to depend on
gauging the expectations of consumers. This was considered to be so
subjective a formula as to render it unworkable. If, however, the test
is whether the product failed in normal use, liability does not depend
on the hypothetical expectations of consumers, but rather on a deter-
178. This is the most effective method of rebutting a res ipsa case. See generally James,
Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitor), 37 VA. L. REv. 179,
225-28 (1951).
179. The implications of utilizing consumer expectation theory may transcend the prima
facie case. To the extent that products liability law is representational, there is an excellent
argument to be made for limiting or negating contributory negligence and comparative fault.
Thus, contributory negligence has not been considered a legitimate affirmative defense against
an express warranty action when the plaintiff did little more than "test the warranty." See
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939). The drafters of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act take the position that actions that are fully contractual are
not covered by the Act. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (a) comment, 12 U.L.A. 37
(Supp. 1983). Admittedly, an action brought under a consumer expectation theory may be less
than fully contractual, but the fairness of penalizing a plaintiff for using a product as it has
been portrayed, either overtly or more subtly by clever advertising, may be questioned. See
Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L.
REV. 797, 802-04 (1977).
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mination as to whether the use was in the core of uses that are indig-
enous to the product.
Another alleged problem with the consumer expectation test is
that it tends to be unworkable for third parties and bystanders who
have no expectations whatsoever with regard to product perform-
ance.180 A normal use-strict liability test, however, applies equally to
purchasers and bystanders.
One may question whether the concept of normal use is so
broad as to make it undefinable. Furthermore, why should liability
be limited to normal use injuries? Shouldn't there be liability for
foreseeable misuse as well? The answers to these questions can only
be understood by appreciating the relationship between a narrowly
focused expectation test and a more broadly-based risk-utility test.
The consumer expectation test cannot be the only test for de-
fect, since it would not cover many cases in which clear consumer
expectations do not exist. As Professor Wade has noted: "In many
situations . .. the consumer would not know what to expect, be-
cause he would have no idea how safe the product could be
made." 81
The inability of the consumer expectation test to cover all cases
does not mean it is worthless. It simply must be limited to those
cases in which consumer use patterns are so clear that the product
can be said to have failed in its normal use. In defining normal use
patterns, courts will take into account the impact of product image
on use patterns. This may cause some concern to defendants in that
it may broaden the base of the standard. However, a test that fixes
liability for normal use patterns, even if it includes a product image
component, can hardly be viewed as unfair.
What will happen to those cases that do not fall into the normal
use category? The answer is that those cases should be litigated us-
ing a risk-utility analysis. This is, indeed, the thrust of Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., Inc.,182 in which the court held:
Numerous California decisions have implicitly recognized this fact
and have made clear, through varying linguistic formulations, that
a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordi-
nary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury deter-
mines that the product's design embodies "excessive preventable
danger," or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger
180. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 472-75.
181. Wade, supra note 137, at 829.
182. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such
design. 18 3
Once it is understood that the consumer expectation test is not
the sole test for defect, but provides a method for resolving a hard
core of product defect cases, many of the problems disappear. It
would be the function of the court in the first instance to determine
whether the injury took place when the product was being put to a
normal use. If a court had any substantial doubt that it was, the
court would then require that the case be litigated utilizing risk-util-
ity principles.184 Similarly, the problem of how to resolve the foresee-
able misuse cases evaporates; only hardcore normal uses would be
governed by the consumer expectation test. All other cases would be
subject to the imposition of liability only if the plaintiff were able to
establish that the product failed to meet societal acceptability under
risk-utility analysis.
C. The Two-Prong Test for Defect-Consumer Expectations and
Risk-Utility Analysis-Some Leading Examples
Several courts have adopted a two-prong test for defect. Under
this approach, a plaintiff can establish defect if he proves either that
the product failed to meet consumer expectations or that the product
was unreasonably dangerous under a risk-utility analysis.
1. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.-The two-prong text was first
adopted in the much cited case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co. 85 In
Heaton, the plaintiff purchased a new Ford four-wheel drive pickup
truck to use for hunting and other cross country purposes. On the
day of the accident, the plaintiff was driving along a blacktop high-
way at a normal speed. The truck hit a rock about five or six inches
in diameter. The truck continued on for about thirty-five miles when
it suddenly left the road and tipped over. After the accident, the rim
of the wheel was found to have separated from the "spider" (the
interior portion of the wheel which is attached to the vehicle by lug
nuts).
The court began its analysis by setting forth that unreasonable
danger would be established if the product was more dangerous than
183. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
184. The screening function of the court is to set the minimum level at which the repre-
sentational theory is credible. The availability of the fall-back risk-utility test allows the court
the discretion to set the threshold at a rather substantial level. For examples of implementation
of the test, see Infra text accompanying notes 185-213.
185. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
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"would be contemplated by the ordinary purchaser." 18 6 This is, of
course, the consumer expectation test. The standard for establishing
this strict liability test was expressed by the court as follows:
When it is shown that a product failed to meet the reasonable ex-
pectations of the user the inference is that there was some sort of
defect, a precise definition of which is unnecessary. If the product
failed under conditions concerning which an average consumer of
that product could have fairly definite expectations, then the jury
would have a basis for making an informed judgment upon the
existence of a defect. The case at bar, however, is not such a
case.2
8 7
The court's emphasis on definite expectations is much in line with
the normal use concept developed earlier.18 "
The court then applied the standard to the facts. The problem
in this case was that there was no way to gauge what consumer ex-
pectations were with regard to the ability of a pick-up truck to sur-
vive a collision at high speed with a five or six inch rock. To send
such a case to a jury on a consumer expectation test would have
invited speculation:
Where the performance failure occurs under conditions with
which the average person has experience, the facts of the accident
alone may constitute a sufficient basis for the jury to decide
whether the expectations of an ordinary consumer of the product
were met. High-speed collisions with large rocks are not so com-
mon, however, that the average person would know from personal
experience what to expect under the circumstances. Nor does any-
thing in the record cast any light upon this issue. The jury would
therefore be unequipped, either by general background or by facts
supplied in the record, to decide whether this wheel failed to per-
form as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected. To
allow the jury to decide purely on its own intuition how strong a
truck wheel should be would convert the concept of strict liability
into the absolute liability of an insurer.189
The court then addressed the alternative test for liabil-
ity-whether the product was reasonably safe. This is the risk-utility
test. It noted that the plaintiff had failed to introduce expert testi-
mony and risk-utility data that would have provided a basis for a
186. Id. at 471, 435 P.2d at 808.
187. Id. at 472, 435 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 166-84.
189. Id. at 473, 435 P.2d at 809.
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decision on the issue of whether the product was reasonably safe.
The court stated:
Where the jury has no experiential basis for knowing this, the re-
cord must supply such a basis. In the absence of either common
experience or evidence, any verdict would, in effect, be the jury's
opinion of how strong the product should be. Such an opinion by
the jury would be formed without the benefit of data concerning
the cost or feasibility of designing and building stronger products.
Without reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special
qualifications for deciding what is reasonable. 190
The process of the court's decision is worthy of note. The court
went through the following steps:
(1) It set forth the consumer expectation test as a first test for
liability.
(2) It defined consumer expectations within the context of normal
use and definite expectations of performance.
(3) It found that under the facts of the case, there were no means to
gauge consumer expectations.
(4) It set forth the alternative test based on risk-utility reasonable-
ness principles.
(5) It found that there was no evidence introduced to support a find-
ing for the plaintiff on risk-utility analysis.
(6) It directed a verdict for the defendant.
2. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.-The case that most
clearly articulated the two-prong test, providing the plaintiff the al-
ternative of proceeding on either consumer expectations or risk-util-
ity grounds, is Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.191 In Barker, the
plaintiff was injured at a construction site while operating a high-lift
loader manufactured by the defendant, Lull Engineering Co. The
loader was utilized to lift a load of lumber on terrain that sloped
sharply in several directions. The injury occurred when the load was
lifted approximately twenty feet above ground. Due to the sharp
slope, the load of lumber shifted and the plaintiff was forced to jump
from the loader. He was struck by a piece of falling lumber and was
seriously injured. The plaintiff contended that the design of the
loader was inadequate: (1) It did not have outriggers to lend stability
to the loader and prevent its tipping on difficult terrain; (2) it was
not equipped with roll bars or seat belts to protect the operator in
190. Id. at 474, 435 P.2d at 809 (emphasis in original).
191. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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the event the machine rolled over; and (3) it lacked an automatic
locking device on the leveling lever to prevent inadvertent bumping
by the operator.
The Barker court found that a consumer expectation approach
to defect was based, in part, on warranty law and, thus, was an ap-
propriate first-level test for defect.192 The court noted, however, that
if consumer expectation was the only test for defect, then all prod-
ucts having patent dangers would be absolved of liability, since such
products tend to meet consumer expectations.193 This would en-
courage the design of patently dangerous, rather than safe, products.
To counter this, the Barker court held that
a product may be found defective in design under either of two
alternative tests. First, a product may be found defective in design
if. . . the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably fore-
seeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be found de-
fective in design if. . . the benefits of the challenged design [do
not] outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design. 194
The two-prong test for defect is set forth with great clarity. What is
less clear is whether the use of the loader on the sharply sloped ter-
rain in Barker would qualify for the consumer expectation test. If, as
I have suggested, the consumer expectation formula ought only to be
used for core product uses (normal use), this case should have been
sent to the jury using only the risk-utility test. The defendant's argu-
ment that the high-lift loader was being misused as a crane would
seem to raise the issue of foreseeable misuse. In such situations there
would appear to be no alternative to risk-utility analysis. The depar-
ture from normal-core uses makes the consumer expectation test im-
practical. The court's articulation of the two-prong test was excel-
lent. Its failure, however, to screen out an inappropriate fact pattern
from the consumer expectation test left it vulnerable to the attack
that this test is overly subjective and standardless.
A similar ambiguity exists in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
192. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
193. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. See infra text accompanying
notes 254-64.
194. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 (emphasis added). The
Barker test also addressed the burdens of proof. In the first prong of the test, the plaintiff is
required to establish that the product failed to meet consumer expectations. In the second
prong, the plaintiff must initially demonstrate that the product was the proximate cause of the
injury; the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the benefits of the product's design
outweigh its inherent risks.
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Beck,19 5 an Alaska case that followed Barker in adopting the two-
prong test for defect. In Caterpillar, the plaintiff's decedent was
killed when a Caterpillar 944 front-end loader that he was operating
rolled over an embankment. The plaintiff contended that Caterpil-
lar's failure to equip the loader with a roll-over protective shield con-
stituted a design defect and was the cause of death.
Although the Alaska court adopted verbatim the Barker two-
prong test for defect, 196 the court did not indicate whether, on the
facts, there was a jury issue under the consumer expectation aspect
of the case. It would seem that the capacity of the loader to protect
the operator in a roll-over accident is not a matter of clear consumer
expectations and is certainly not within the core uses of the product.
Such a case should go to the jury only under risk-utility analysis.
There is some general language in Caterpillar indicating that the
case should be given to the jury, instructing them as to both the
consumer expectation and risk-utility tests.1" If the court is pre-
pared to do so, they would be straining the consumer expectation or
normal use test beyond its rational limits. In a case of such complex-
ity, there is really no alternative to submitting the case to the jury
with the full panoply of risk-utility data and expert testimony that
would focus on the feasibility, cost, and utility of the suggested
safety mechanisms.
3. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.-A recent
adoption of the two-step test for defect by the New Jersey Supreme
Court is of particular importance. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry
& Machine Co.,198 the court departed from an earlier decision in
which it had defined defect solely in terms of the risk-utility
formula. 19 The case is important because the court did not expressly
adopt the two-prong formula for defect. Yet, when one reads Suter
carefully, one is led inexorably to the conclusion that the court has
adopted a test in which consumer expectations and risk-utility bal-
ancing are to be applied in the alternative.
In Suter, the plaintiff was hurt when his hand was caught in the
cylinders of an industrial sheet metal rolling machine. The machine
forms straight sheet metal into cylinders. The accident occurred in
the process of rerolling a metal cylinder. The plaintiff was standing
195. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
196. Id. at 884.
197. Id. at 886.
198. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
199. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
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on the left side of the machine and saw a piece of slag lying in the
metal cylinder. As he reached over to pull the slag out, he pushed a
gear lever into the forward position and activated the rollers. The
fingers of his right hand were caught and pulled into the rollers. The
plaintiff managed to yank his hand free only after it had been se-
verely injured. The design defect alleged in this case was that a ro-
tary guard should have been inserted around the lever to protect it
from inadvertant contact or, in the alternative, the lever should have
been placed higher above the floor.
The Suter court first determined that the threshold test for lia-
bility ought to be based on consumer expectations:
We perceive that the only additional question to be put to the
jury in a case involving a design defect, vis-a-vis other defects, is
whether the product design was improper. In some improper design
situations the nature of the proofs will be the same as in other un-
intended defect cases. This occurs when it is self-evident that the
product is not reasonably suitable and safe and fails to perform,
contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that it would "safely
do the jobs for which it was built." . . . Thus, if one purchased a
bicycle whose brakes did not hold because of an improper design,
that manufacturer's responsibility would be clear without more.
The product would not satisfy the reasonable expectations of the
purchaser. 200
The court then noted that in cases where there were no clear expec-
tations, it would apply a reasonableness test:
In a design defect case when this factor is absent, other than
assuming that the manufacturer knew of the harmful propensity of
the product, "the question then becomes whether the defendant
was negligent to people who might be harmed by that condition if
they came into contact with it or were in the vicinity of it. '201
In the final paragraph of the majority opinion, the court sum-
marized how the issue of defect should be determined:
When submitting the case to a jury, the court should charge gener-
ally that a manufacturer has an obligation to distribute products
which are reasonably fit, suitable and safe for their intended or
foreseeable purposes. If that obligation is violated and a user or
others who may be expected to come in contact with the product
are injured as a result, then the manufacturer is responsible for the
200. 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150 (citations omitted).
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ensuing damages. Design defect cases are covered as well within
that context. In those design defect situations in which the defect is
not self-evident, the trial court should also charge the jury on
whether the manufacturer, it being deemed to have known of the
harmful propensity of the product, acted as a reasonably prudent
one. Depending on the proofs, the trial court should explain perti-
nent factors related to the determination of reasonable prudence. 02
It is clear that the New Jersey court is, in truth, espousing a two-
prong test for defect. The first category of defect is those clear cases
where the product is not "reasonably fit, suitable and safe for their
intended or foreseeable purposes. 20 3 This is the consumer expecta-
tion test. The second prong is the test of negligence (risk-utility),
with the caveat that the manufacturer is "deemed to have known of
the harmful propensity of the product." 20'
The lesson is clear. Cases must be carefully scrutinized to deter-
mine whether they permit the submission of the defect issue to the
jury on a consumer expectations count alone. The New Jersey Su-
preme Court has accomplished this, although it has not flagged this
approach with the clarity of the California and Alaska courts in,
respectively, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.205 and Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck.2 °6
4. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp .- The most recent
judicial contribution giving form to the consumer expectation test is
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.20 7 In that case, the Ohio Su-
preme Court emphasized the importance of advertising to consumer
202. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
203. Id.
204. Id. Suter has been criticized as being a poorly worded opinion. See Birnbaum,
supra note 24, at 624 ("a rather muddled variation of the Barker test").
Strict adherence to the language in Suter yields a curious result. It appears to require
that a jury be instructed on risk-utility only when the court believes that the product in fact
met consumer expectations. If the court believes that the product will fail to meet consumer
expectations, Suter indicates that no risk-utility instruction is to be given. In such a case, a
negative jury determination on the consumer expectation issue will compel a finding of no
liability, since the risk-utility instruction would not have been given.
The imprecise wording of the opinion has led one notewriter to suggest that Suter imposes
the consumer expectation test as a maximum determinant of liability. See Note, The Design
Defect Case In New Jersey: An Unworkable Standard, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1297, 1313 n.1 11
(1982). The court's language should have included a jury instruction to the effect that if they
do not find the defect to be self-evident, then they are to decide the case on risk-utility
grounds.
205. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
206. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
207. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
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expectations. The plaintiffs sued for injuries enhanced by the defec-
tive design of a Jeep in which they were passengers during a roll-
over accident. The accident occurred when the Jeep was traveling
downhill on rough terrain. The Jeep pitched over and landed upside-
down on its roll-bar. The roll-bar collapsed, resulting in severe inju-
ries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs premised their case on the failure
of the Jeep to meet consumer expectations. They contended that the
Jeep was advertised as a vehicle capable of being driven downhill
over rugged terrain.
The television advertising campaign was aimed at encouraging
people to buy a Jeep. Consider the following messages: "'Ever dis-
cover the rough, exciting world of mountains, forest, rugged terrain?
The original Jeep can get you there, and Jeep guts will bring you
back.' "208 One Jeep television advertisement challenges a young
man accompanied by his girl friend: "'[Y]ou guys aren't yellow, are
you? Is it a steep hill? Yeah, little lady, you could say it is a steep
hill. Let's try it. The King of the Hill, is about to discover the new
Jeep CJ-7.' "I9
The plaintiffs testified that they had seen the commercials and
that they thought the roll-bar would protect them if the vehicle
landed on its top. The court, in approving a test for defect based on
disappointed consumer expectations, held:
The commercial advertising of a product will be the guiding force
upon the expectations of consumers with regard to the safety of a
product, and is highly relevant to a formulation of what those ex-
pectations might be. The particular manner in which a product is
advertised as being used is also relevant to a determination of the
intended and reasonably foreseeable uses of the product. Therefore,
it was not error to admit the commercial advertising in evidence to
establish consumer expectation of safety and intended use.21 °
There are two significant aspects to the court's decision. First,
the court was willing to predicate liability for disappointed consumer
expectations based on the advertisements and the general product
image. The court did so in the face of an argument by the defendant
that "'a jury may not base its verdict upon such television commer-
cials in the absence of a specific representation contained in the com-
mercials as to the quality or merit of the product in question
208. ld. at 459, 424 N.E.2d at 572.
209. Id. at 460, 424 N.E.2d at 573.
210. Id. at 469, 424 N.E.2d at 578.
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... , "21 The case makes no mention of express warranty. The
consumer expectation test is thus set free from the constraints of
specificity imposed by the more staid express warranty doctrine.
Second, the court was willing to impose liability without estab-
lishing that the roll-bar failed to meet risk-utility standards. Indeed,
the dissent attacked the Leichtamer majority on this very ground.2 12
The dissent argued that it was improper to permit recovery when the
plaintiff had failed to establish a practicable, safer alternative de-
sign. For the majority this was irrelevant since the Jeep failed to
meet consumer expectations. The independence of the consumer ex-
pectation test from risk-utility, thus, was firmly established in
Ohio. 213
D. Consumer Expectations and Foreseeable Use
Several of the consumer expectation decisions take the position
that a manufacturer should be liable if the product fails to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
"intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. '214 Care must be taken
that the "reasonably foreseeable" aspect of the definition does not
destroy the basic validity of the test. "Reasonable foreseeability" is a
concept that is so elastic that it could be stretched to encompass
some very remote risk.21"5 Even uses that are quite abnormal and not
within the suggested normal use parameters could squeak by a fore-
seeability test. As noted earlier, the fact patterns in such cases as
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.216 and Caterpillar Tractor Co.
v. Beck,217 though arguably foreseeable, should not qualify for the
consumer expectation test. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.21 8
is a much more difficult case since the advertisement suggested very
rugged use over hilly terrain. Thus, even though the case involved an
211. Id.
212. Id. at 477-82, 424 N.E.2d at 583-85 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
213. See also Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 469, 424 N.E.2d 568, 576
(1981).
215. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964); Kewanee Mach.
& Conveyor Co., 59 Ill. App. 3d 578, 375 N.E.2d 885 (1978); Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shop-
ping Serv., 16 I!!. App. 3d 339, 306 N.E.2d 312 (1973); Koski v. Automatic Heating Serv., 75
Mich. App. 180, 254 N.W.2d 836 (1977).
216. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
217. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
218. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
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injury occasioned by a car rollover, there was a legitimate jury ques-
tion as to the scope of consumer expectations.
There is simply no substitute for tight judicial control of the
consumer expectation test. Courts will have to monitor carefully the
cases in which it may legitimately operate. If they do not, the con-
sumer expectation test has the potential of devouring all design liti-
gation. The risk-utility test would then rarely be engaged and defen-
dants would be stripped of their only real line of defense in design
litigation.
The failure to realize that such judicial control is crucial to the
operation of the consumer expectation test well may have led the
Texas Supreme Court to overturn an earlier decision that adopted
the two-prong defect test and return to a risk-utility standard as the
only viable standard for design cases. In Turner v. General Motors
Corp.,2 19 the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when his 1969 Chevro-
let Impala sedan overturned as he swerved to avoid a collision with a
truck. The car rolled over once and the roof caved in at the driver's
corner when it hit the ground. Although his seat belt was buckled,
the plaintiff was struck on his head and suffered a crushed vertebra,
resulting in paralysis. The alleged design defect was that the roof
structure of the car was inadequately designed to withstand a rol-
lover collision.
The court used the occasion of Turner to indicate its dissatisfac-
tion with the consumer expectation test that was part of a bifurcated
test for defect. It reiterated the criticism that consumer expectations
would hardly be anything more than the personal experiences of the
jurors.220 In an earlier opinion that was later withdrawn, the court
set forth the argument of General Motors that it was unfair to predi-
cate liability on the basis of consumer expectations because "the or-
dinary consumer does not have any realistic expectations concerning
the forces generated in a rollover of an automobile." '221 It was fur-
ther argued that "[t]he design of an automobile roof involves techni-
cal considerations and that actual consumer expectations provide no
rational basis for determining whether a design is unreasonably dan-
gerous. The consumer may expect too much or too little, or have no
expectations at all. 222
219. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
220. Id. at 851.
221. Turner v. General Motors Corp., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 8400, at 17,980 (Mar. 21, 1979), withdrawn, 584 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. 1979).
222. Id.
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There may be valid grounds for not using the consumer expecta-
tion test. But the inappropriateness of the test to the facts of Tur-
ner223 does not mean that the test is invalid. It simply means that, in
many cases, the consumer expectation test should not be utilized.
Indeed, the two-prong test is predicated on the belief that there exist
design defect cases for which the consumer expectation test will not
work. In those instances risk-utility analysis becomes the test for
defect.
To summarize: A major objection to the consumer expectation
test is that it is too open-ended and subjective. It is easy to point to
fact patterns for which it would be highly inappropriate to utilize the
consumer expectation test. That does not mean, however, that there
does not exist a core of consumer uses well within the normal use
range for which it is an appropriate and useful test for defect.
E. Rejection of Consumer Expectation Test Because of Strict
Liability
The most significant and telling objection to the consumer ex-
pectation test is that it imposes true strict liability. The risk-utility
test permits the defendant to interpose a defense that his product
meets the level of societal acceptability by demonstrating that, given
the benefits of the product to society, its usefulness outweighs its
risks. In contrast, the consumer expectation test permits no such de-
fense. When the product is in normal use, the product should cause
no injury; if it does, the defendant is liable. That this is the thrust of
the consumer expectation test is evident from the two-prong process.
Only if a product meets the consumer expectation test is it necessary
for the plaintiff to establish that the product does not meet risk-util-
ity standards; if the product fails the consumer expectation test, de-
fect is made out without a determination of risk-utility standards.
Therefore, even if it could be shown that the product was reasonably
safe given risk-utility balancing, the plaintiff recovers nonetheless
upon showing that the product failed to meet consumer expectations.
This expression of the strict liability principle has caused serious
concern in both judicial and academic quarters.2 It deserves careful
223. Thus, Professor Epstein, an advocate of the consumer expectation test, recognizes
that it would have been inappropriate as applied to the facts of Turner. See R. EPSTEIN, supra
note 140, at 82 n.27.
224. See, e.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 477-82, 424
N.E.2d 568, 582-85 (1981) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Keeton, supra note 145; Schwartz, supra
note 154.
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exploration.
A leading critic of the two-prong test for defect, Professor Page
Keeton, argues that if the consumer's expectations are unrealistic
with regard to product performance, he may have grounds for a
cause of action for failure to warn.225 This is a theory that fits into
risk-utility analysis. 26 Professor Keeton illustrates this concern with
the following hypothetical:
If a product such as a drug produces a harmful side effect which
was unknowable by either the seller or the user, then it is of course
ipso facto more dangerous than the ordinary purchaser would have
contemplated it to be, but if, (1) there was no breach of duty to
disclose a risk or danger that should have been discoverable in the
exercise of ordinary care, and (2) the benefits far outweighed its
dangers, then the maker or seller has served society well. It can be
argued that cost of mishaps due to side effects of this kind should
be borne by the maker but surely not on the theory that the prod-
uct is defective. 7
Professor Gary Schwartz has set forth a similar concern.228 In
analyzing the two-prong test articulated in Barker v. Lull Engineer-
ing Co., Inc.,219 he notes that the consumer expectation test does not
permit rebuttal evidence on the issue of risk-utility analysis:
A jury considers the consumer expectations question subse-
quent to the accident in which the product has performed in a cer-
225. Keeton, supra note 145.
226. Thus, Professor Keeton notes:
It is quite clear that to the extent that a maker knows, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should know, of a risk or hazard that users may not discover or appre-
ciate, liability results for breach of the duty to disclose what a reasonable person
would disclose. This ground of liability protects users and consumers to a considera-
ble extent from harm resulting from unappreciated dangers. It is submitted, how-
ever, that an inquiry as to whether the danger in fact of the design outweighed the
benefits of the design would better protect users and consumers, without placing an
undue burden on manufacturers and suppliers. The court's primary justification for
the retention of the contemplation test is the ease with which the plaintiff can estab-
lish a design defect under this test by circumstantial evidence. If a claimant proves
that a product fails under circumstances the ordinary purchaser or user would not
have expected, a case has been made. That is clearly so, but the question is, should
it be so? I think not. If the court would permit the defendant to show under a risk-
utility analysis by way of rebuttal that it would not be feasible, then the position
would be supportable.
Id. at 310 (footnotes omitted).
227. Id. at 303 (footnote omitted).
228. See Schwartz, supra note 154.
229. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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tain way. Perhaps a jury will find "consumer" expectations denied
if it-the jury-feels that a properly designed product would have
performed better. So utilized, the consumer expectations prong
amounts to the risk-benefit prong looked at from a res ipsa loquitor
point of view. Res ipsa can claim a significant role in the proof of
products cases. But to suggest that a res ipsa analysis is appropri-
ate in every product design case would be plainly wrong. And even
if res ipsa "applies" on the risk-benefit issue, the manufacturer is
entitled to rebut with trade-off evidence. Yet, under Barker's con-
sumer expectations prong, the manufacturer has no such opportu-
nity-a finding that consumer expectations have been denied is
conclusive of liability. Given the finality under Barker of a negative
consumer expectation finding, and given that Barker expressly ad-
vances the consumer expectations standard as an alternative to the
risk-benefit standard, it is clear that Barker's consumer expecta-
tions test cannot be regarded as merely a res ipsa approach to risk-
benefit.230
Professor Schwartz also contends that, in most instances, a plaintiff
should be able to establish a case based on consumer expectations by
setting forth a failure to warn theory. 3
The battle lines are thus drawn between those courts that will
insist on an instruction based on unreasonable danger (risk-utility)
and those that will permit an instruction on a true strict liability
theory based on consumer expectations. Those courts that insist on
retaining the consumer expectation test are apparently unwilling to
rely solely on failure to warn theory to establish liability where con-
sumer expectations have not been met. Their position is readily ex-
plainable. There are products that cannot be made safe for normal
use even with a warning.23 2 Consumer expectations would remain
higher than product capability with or without a warning.. To be
sure, this would still permit a case to be made out on the basis of
failure to warn. But the true issue would be avoided. Since the warn-
ing would not solve the problem with the product, the only rational
way to address the question would be to redesign the product. This
would, however, bring us full circle back to risk-utility analysis-the
very approach we were seeking to avoid by use of the consumer ex-
pectation test. Furthermore, the plaintiff would be burdened to
demonstrate affirmatively the inadequacy of the warning. It is hard
230. Schwartz, supra note 154, at 472 n.217 (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 476-78, 481.
232. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra
note 15, at 506-07.
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to set aside the common notion that a consumer who is injured while
using a product in its normal fashion ought not to bear the responsi-
bility of showing what went wrong.
F. Defining Consumer Expectations in Risk-Utility Terms-The
Ultimate in Confusion
Several courts have managed to create a test for defect that
utilizes both the consumer expectation concept and risk-utility the-
ory without engaging in a two-step analysis. Instead, they have man-
aged to confuse and intermingle both tests to such a degree that
there is no single coherent definition of defect available.
Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert233 is illustrative of this
approach. In this case, a husband and wife, the driver and passenger,
respectively, in a Volkswagen microbus, were killed when the vehicle
collided with the rear of a flatbed truck. The contention of the plain-
tiff-administrator of their estates was that the microbus was defec-
tively designed because it permitted the invasion of the passenger
compartment when the vehicle collided at relatively low speeds. The
court said:
[W]e hold that liability is imposed under section 402A if a product
is not reasonably safe. This means that it must be unsafe to an
extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by the
ordinary consumer. This evaluation of the product in terms of the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer allows the trier
of the fact to take into account the intrinsic nature of the product.
The purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the same
degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expensive
Cadillac. It must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a rela-
tive, not an absolute concept.
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative
cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the
claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or mini-
mizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In other in-
stances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed de-
fect may make other factors relevant to the issue.2 34
Note that liability is predicated on consumer expectations, which are
defined in terms of risk-utility analysis. This seems to be a tortuous
route to the implementation of risk-utility analysis. The two-prong
233. 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
234. Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
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test of Barker had the virtue of focusing on consumer expectations
as an independent test for defect. One can agree or disagree with
Barker, but at least one is sure of what the court sought to accom-
plish. To fashion a consumer expectation test with a risk-utility base
serves only to confuse the issue.
In Aller v. Rodgers Machine Co.,23 5 the Iowa court also appears
to have confused the two standards. The court, setting forth the un-
reasonable danger standard, indicated that the product must be dan-
gerous to an extent beyond that which would be expected by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it.236 The court, however, then
went on to say:
In order to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous,
the injured plaintiff must prove the product is dangerous and that
it was unreasonable for such a danger to exist. Proof of unreasona-
bleness involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is
the utility of the product and on the other is the risk of its use.237
Several courts have phrased their consumer expectation test to
say that the product must be so dangerous that it would not meet the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to safety.2 "
This approach again leads to a risk-utility analysis since the focus is
on what a consumer has a right to expect rather than what he or she
actually expects in fact.
All of the above stated formulations confuse the consumer ex-
pectation standard with risk-utility analysis. When jurors are fed
this confusion in a set of complex jury instructions, they can only be
adrift at sea as to how they are to define defect.2 39 If the consumer
expectation test is to be utilized, it will have to be used as an inde-
pendent test for defect. If not, it should be abandoned.
G. The Intended Use Test-A Variation on the Consumer
Expectation Test
There is one additional variation on the theme of consumer ex-
235. 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
236. Id. at 834.
237. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
238. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170-71, 176, 406
A.2d 140, 140, 153 (1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542
P.2d 774, 779 (1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis.
2d 322, 326, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975).
239. For a discussion of the confusing nature of jury instructions in products liability
cases, see O'Donnell, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem of Jury Instructions
Which Do Not Instruct, 56 U. DFr. J. URB. L. 1051 (1979).
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pectations that has caused considerable consternation. This variation
posits that the product manufacturer is the guarantor of the prod-
uct's safety. In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.,2 40 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court approved the following jury instruction, which em-
bodies the guarantor concept:
"The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The
product must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary
to make if safe for [its intended] use, and without any condition
that makes it unsafe for [its intended] use. If you find that the
product, at the time it left the defendant's control, lacked any ele-
ment necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use or contained
any condition that made it unsafe for [its intended] use, then the
product was defective, and the defendant is liable for all harm
caused by such defect. 241
At first glance, the Pennsylvania guarantor rule appears to be
unworkable. Professor Henderson's sharp attack on the rule 42 would
seem to be on target:
Taken literally, the test is absurd and unworkable. No sensible per-
son would insist that a product designer must include every precau-
tion, however costly. At bottom, the design alternatives to which
plaintiffs point in these cases must be shown somehow to have been
feasible, or sensible, regardless of whether one speaks in terms of
"unreasonable danger." For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
suggest otherwise is nonsensical.2
4
Note, however, that the Pennsylvania court limited the imposition of
liability to cases in which the product failed to have a safety feature
that would make it safe only for its intended use. Once we limit
recovery to core-intended uses, then there is nothing draconian about
imposing liability for the failure of the product without requiring
risk-utility analysis. This is no different than the basic thrust of
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.,244 Suter v. San Angelo Foun-
dry & Machine Co.,245 and the other opinions that have applied a
240. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
241. Id. at 559-60 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
242. Henderson, Products Liability: Controversial New Decision on Design Defects, 2
CORP. L. REv. 246 (1979).
243. Id. at 248. See also Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773,
800-01 (1979).
244. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
245. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
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two-prong defect analysis.2 46 As I have noted, a consumer expecta-
tion test must focus on core uses to be workable. The proposed Az-
zarello test would be no different in this aspect of the defect
definition.
The most interesting and novel twist in the Azzarello case
comes not from its requirement that the manufacturer is the guaran-
tor of the product, but from its redefinition of the role of the judge
and jury in a design defect case. An understanding of this aspect of
the case is crucial to an appreciation of its guarantor rule. At the
outset, the court was asked to decide whether an instruction that
imposed a requirement that the product be unreasonably dangerous
was consistent with strict liability.247 The fact pattern raised the is-
sue of design defect. The plaintiff's right hand was pinched between
two hard rubber rollers in a coating machine manufactured by the
defendant. The lower court had imposed a requirement of unreason-
able danger as a predicate to liability.24 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overruled, opting instead for the guarantor standard.
Before it set forth its new standard, the Pennsylvania court ex-
amined the role of risk-utility analysis in a design defect case. It
admitted that an examination of risk-utility considerations was cru-
cial and should be undertaken. In its view, however, this was a func-
tion for the court in its policymaking role; it was not a question for
the jury at all:
[t]he mere fact that we have approved Section 402A, and even if
we agree that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" serves a useful
purpose in predicting liability in this area, it does not follow that
this language should be used in framing the issues for the jury's
consideration. Should an ill-conceived design which exposes the
user to the risk of harm entitle one injured by the product to re-
cover? Should adequate warnings of the dangerous propensities of
an article insulate one who suffers injuries from those propensities?
When does the utility of a product outweigh the unavoidable dan-
ger it may pose? These are questions of law and their resolution
depends upon social policy. Restated, the phrases "defective condi-
tion" and "unreasonably dangerous" as used in the Restatement
formulation are terms of art invoked when strict liability is appro-
priate. It is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiff's
averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after
246. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Heaton v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967).
247. 480 Pa. at 549-50, 391 A.2d at 1021-22.
248. Id. at 550-51, 391 A.2d at 1022.
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this judicial determination is made is the cause submitted to the
jury to determine whether the facts of the case support the aver-
ments of the complaint. They do not fall within the orbit of a fac-
tual dispute which is properly assigned to the jury for resolution. A
standard suggesting the existence of a "defect" if the article is un-
reasonably dangerous or not duly safe is inadequate to guide a lay
jury in resolving these questions. 249
The position of the Azzarello court that risk-utility analysis
should be for the court alone, as a matter of public policy cannot be
dismissed out of hand. The policy implications of design defect liti-
gation are of great moment. When a court declares a design defec-
tive it affects not only the entire product-line of that manufacturer,
but sometimes the design of products throughout the industry.250
The decision by the Pennsylvania court to place the responsibility
solely on the court on the issue of risk-utility analysis gives evidence
of a rather strong desire on the part of the court to control the flow
of cases to the jury. Thus, unlike the analysis of Professor Henderson
and other academic critics,251 I would conclude that the Azzarello
case contracts the scope of liability rather than expands it.
It would appear that the following methodology is dictated by
Azzarello: (1) The parties will introduce risk-utility evidence. They
will also introduce evidence as to the safety of the product for its
intended use. (2) The court will determine whether the evidence
would support an alternative design under risk-utility analysis. The
court will consider the policy implications that would result if it were
to find the design defective. (3) If the court decides that the policy
considerations arising from risk-utility analysis are too weighty to
require a design change or a warning, the court will declare the de-
sign nondefective and direct a verdict for the defendant. (4) If the
court finds that an alternative design would not impose dispropor-
tionate costs to society, it will submit the question of defect to the
jury with the instruction that the manufacturer is the guarantor of
the safety of the product when it fails in its intended use. The court
having decided that an alternative design is within the realm of pos-
sibility, it now gives to the jury the decision as to whether it should
249. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
250. See Twerski, supra note 8, at 545-47; Wade, supra note 137, at 838.
251. See Birnbaum, supra note 24, at 636-39; Note, Restatement (Second) of
Torts-Section 402A-Uncertain Standards of Responsibility in Design Defect Cases-After
Azzarello, Will Manufacturers be Absolutely Liable in Pennsylvania?, 24 VILL. L. REV. 1035,
1050 (1979).
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have been implemented in this case.
The aforementioned structure does remove the issue of reasona-
bleness from the jury. Traditionally, this has been an issue that has
been within the jury's domain.252 However, the fear that design de-
fect litigation may cause devastating consequences to industry may
justify this unorthodox approach. In a sense, Azzarello gives us the
two-prong Barker test in reverse. First, the court decides whether an
alternative design is feasible under risk-utility analysis. Then a jury
decides whether failure to implement the feasible design has suffi-
ciently disappointed consumer expectations when the product has
been put to its intended use.
This novel approach to design defect litigation raises three seri-
ous problems. First, it removes from jury consideration those risk-
utility cases in which the evidence is closely balanced. That the role
of the jury is to be so sharply limited on the issue of product reason-
ableness is a matter of concern since the jury has traditionally
played an important role in the expansion of the law of products
liability. Second, defendants would not be liable for injuries caused
through an intended use if the product met risk-utility standards.
Third, the limitation of liability to the intended use seems to remove
the foreseeable misuse cases from the liability picture. As noted ear-
lier, the consumer expectation test should not include foreseeable
misuse cases;253 they should be covered by risk-utility analysis.
H. Consumer Expectation Test as the Only Test for Defect
Earlier discussion has focused on whether it is possible to define
defect solely on the basis of consumer expectations without adverting
to risk-utility analysis. In this section the focus will be on whether a
jurisdiction can successfully operate with consumer expectations as
the only test for defect.
Although some jurisdictions have defined defect on the basis of
consumer expectations alone, a moment's reflection will demonstrate
the problem with this approach. A rule that would hold a product
defective only if it fails to meet consumer expectations would rein-
state the patent danger rule to its prior position of primacy in prod-
uct liability law.254 A product that is patently dangerous almost in-
252. W. PROSSER, supra note 32, § 37, at 207-08.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
254. See Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality, 29
MERCER L. REv. 583, 598-99 (1979); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, supra note
137, at 1304.
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variably meets consumer expectations and is thus absolved of
liability. This would mean that an obviously dangerous product that
could be made safer well within the constraints of risk-utility guide-
lines would be declared nondefective. Given the widespread dissatis-
faction with the patent danger rule,255 it would make little sense to
make the consumer expectation test the only test for defect.
The tendency to utilize the consumer expectation test to reach a
decision that a product is not defective without examining the risk-
utility factors is great. It hangs on with all the tenacity of original
sin. Vineyard v. Empire Machine Co. 258 illustrates the problem. In
that case, a construction worker brought an action against the manu-
facturer and seller of a huge earth moving machine for injuries sus-
tained when the machine overturned. On the day of the accident, the
plaintiff had deposited a load of fill dirt while proceeding down a
steep slope. As he pulled the trailer portion of the scraper over the
fill he had just deposited, the rear trailer portion of the scraper
started to slip down an incline, which in turn pulled over the tractor.
The plaintiff either jumped or was thrown from the scraper, result-
ing in serious injuries, including a crushed leg, which was subse-
quently amputated. The plaintiff alleged that the design of the ma-
chine was defective since the absence of protective roll-bars was
responsible for the increased severity of his injury.
The court acknowledged that the patent danger rule was not the
governing rule in Arizona.25  Nevertheless, the court continued to
define the "unreasonable danger" standard within the confines of the
consumer expectation test. It held the Restatement's definition appli-
cable: "'The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the commu-
nity as to its characteristics.' "258
Applying this standard, the court found that the sole defect al-
255. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1978); Dorsey v.
Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid mem. sub nom. Yoder Co. v. General
Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348
N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508,
476 P.2d 713 (1970); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 28.5 (1956); Darling,
supra note 254, at 588-89.
256. 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1978).
257. See id. at 504-05, 581 P.2d at 1154-55.
258. Id. at 505, 581 P.2d at 1155 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment i (1965)).
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leged was the lack of roll-over bars. This danger was readily appar-
ent to the user:
The only danger presented by the lack of roll-over bars is if this 20-
ton piece of heavy equipment should turn over. There was no evi-
dence that this particular piece of equipment had such a propen-
sity. The danger presented by the slight chance that this scraper
would turn over and that roll-over bars would not be present to
protect the driver, is not a danger "to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer."2 59
Note the fallacy that follows from declaring the consumer expecta-
tion test the sole test for defect. The court did not inquire as to the
possible risk-utility trade-offs and the feasibility of roll-over bars but
decided that the product met consumer expectations and, thus, lia-
bility would not be imposed. Although the court said that it was not
slavishly following the patent danger rule, in reality, the court ap-
plied it in the guise of the consumer expectation test.
A similar fallacy is found in the reasoning of the court in Hart-
man v. Miller Hydro Co. 260 In that case, the plaintiff was injured
when his trousers were caught in an unguarded drive shaft of a bot-
tle washing machine. The design defect alleged was the failure to
install a guard over a revolving shaft and to provide an emergency
stop switch for the shaft near the operator's station.
There was conflicting testimony as to whether the manufacturer
had installed a safety guard that had been removed at a later time.
However, the court found that in any event, the absence of the safety
guard would not have fulfilled the requirement that the machine be
unreasonably dangerous to impose liability. The court said:
A product is unreasonably dangerous only if it is dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community
as to its characteristics.
Hartman testified he was never warned that a guard should be
placed over the shaft, and that he did not know leaning against the
exposed shaft was dangerous. As assistant production manager re-
sponsible for plant safety, however, he must be accredited with suf-
ficient intelligence to realize that an exposed revolving shaft is dan-
gerous. This conclusion is supported by the fact that another
employee had previously become caught in the same shaft. Thus, it
259. Id.
260. 449 F.2d 191 (10th Cir. 1974).
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cannot be said that a danger existed which was beyond contempla-
tion of an ordinary user. The danger was obvious. 61
The Montana Supreme Court, in Stenberg v.- Beatrice Foods
Co.,262 indicated that it would not be lulled by the Restatement lan-
guage into adopting the patent danger rule sub silentio. In Stenberg,
the plaintiff lost his arm when it got caught in the intake end of a
grain auger. The design defect alleged was the failure of the ma-
chine to be equipped with proper shields and guards. The jury, at
one point, was instructed that to find the product unreasonably dan-
gerous, it must find the product "'dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchased it ... 263 The court found this instruction erroneous.
It stated:
The problem with using the Restatement definition of "unrea-
sonably dangerous" is well illustrated by what happened in this
case. Defendant manufacturer consistently maintained it was not
liable as a matter of law because the unshielded intake end of the
grain auger could be seen by an ordinary consumer or user of the
product, and therefore the danger could be contemplated. Plaintiff
did not dispute that he saw the unshielded intake end of the grain
auger, and he also recognized it as being dangerous. Surely, if he
could see the danger, he could contemplate the danger. Under the
court's instruction therefore, it was a simple matter for the jury to
conclude that the unshielded intake end of the grain auger was not
unreasonably dangerous, because plaintiff saw it and could contem-
plate what he had seen.
...Under this type of instruction it would be virtually impos-
sible for an open and obvious condition to be unreasonably danger-
ous. For all practical purposes recovery would be limited to latent
conditions.264
I. Applying the Consumer Expectation Test to the Various
Forms of Defect
In earlier sections, the usefulness of a sharply focused consumer
expectation test as one prong of the defect definition was set forth. It
now must be determined whether the consumer expectation test will
261. Id. at 194 (footnote omitted).
262. 176 Mont. 123, 576 P.2d 725 (1978).
263. Id. at 130, 576 P.2d at 729.
264. Id. at 131-32, 576 P.2d at 730-31.
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be applied equally to production defects, design defects, and failure
to warn cases. Logic demands that the consumer expectation test be
applied to all types of defect. Indeed, the very strength of the test is
that is can easily be utilized without regard to the type of defect
under consideration.
The essence of the consumer expectation test, as outlined
herein, is that the law permits recovery for the failure of a product
within the core of normal uses. When this type of failure occurs, the
defendant should not be allowed to argue that the product meets
risk-utility guidelines. If the product is not up to performance expec-
tations within normal use parameters, there should be no defense of
reasonableness allowed. Nor should plaintiff have to bear the burden
of showing that this particular unit failed to meet the defendant's
own manufacturing standards. The consumer expectation test is a
product performance test that wipes away from the liability picture
the defendant's excuses for product failure. If a plaintiff can estab-
lish liability on the basis of the product's failure to meet consumer
expectations, he need not allege, nor prove, either production defect,
design defect, or failure to warn. As noted earlier, the consumer ex-
pectation test becomes a sort or irrebutable res ipsa test.265 If this is
so, it is of no concern to the plaintiff what specifically went wrong
with the product while in normal use, only that something indeed
went wrong and that it caused injury. Although there is an inference
to be drawn from some of the cases that the consumer expectation
test is to be utilized only for design defect cases,26 6 this position
seems illogical and inconsistent with the basic thrust of the theory.
J. Application of the Consumer Expectation Test to Food
Products
The consumer expectation test has been of special importance in
resolving the question-of whether foreign objects in food preparations
are defective. Is a chicken bone found in a chicken pie a defect? Is a
walnut shell found in maple walnut ice cream a defect? Or a pearl in
oyster stew? The courts have had great difficulty with these cases
and seem to have found an acceptable answer to their dilemma in
the consumer expectation test.
For many years, the test used for deciding the issue of what was
or was not a contaminant in food preparations was the foreign-natu-
265. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
266. See Schwartz, supra note 154, at 479 n.252.
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ral substance test. This test was first expressed in Mix v. Ingersoll
Candy Co.267 There, the plaintiff brought suit for injuries caused by
a fragment of chicken bone found in a chicken pie. The California
court held that the chicken pie was not unfit for human consumption
as a matter of law:
[W]e are of the opinion that despite the fact that a chicken bone
may occasionally be encountered in a chicken pie, such chicken pie,
in the absence of some further defect, is reasonably fit for human
consumption. Bones which are natural to the type of meat served
cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer
who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and be on his guard
against the presence of such bones. At least he cannot hold the
restaurant keeper whose representation implied by law is that the
meat dish is reasonably fit for human consumption, liable for any
injury occurring as a result of the presence of a chicken bone in
such chicken pie.268
The foreign-natural test for determining whether a substance is
a contaminant has been subject to considerable ridicule. In Zabner v.
Howard Johnson's Inc.,26 9 the Florida court noted that natural sub-
stances could often be as dangerous to the consumer as foreign ob-
jects. The court said: "Naturalness of the substance to any ingredi-
ents in the food served is important only in determining whether the
consumer may reasonably expect to find such substance in the par-
ticular type of dish or style of food served. 270
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Betehia v. Cape
Cod Corp.,271 rejected the foreign-natural test. In that case, the
plaintiff suffered an injury from a chicken bone that was present in a
chicken sandwich. The court held:
The "foreign-natural" test applied as a matter of law does not
recommend itself to us as being logical or desirable. It is true one
can expect a T-bone in T-bone steak, chicken bones in roast chick-
en, pork bone in a pork chop, pork bone in spare ribs, a rib bone in
short ribs of beef, and fish bones in a whole baked or fried fish, but
the expectation is based not on the naturalness of the particular
bone to the meat, fowl, or fish, but on the type of dish served con-
taining the meat, fowl, or fish. There is a distinction between what
267. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
268. Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
269. 201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
270. Id. at 826.
271. 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
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a consumer expects to find in a fish stick and in a baked or fried
fish, or in a chicken sandwich made from sliced white meat and in
roast chicken. The test should be what is reasonably expected by
the consumer in the food as served, not what might be natural to
the ingredients of tfiat food prior to preparation. What is to be
reasonably expected by the consumer is a jury question in most
cases; at least, we cannot say as a matter of law that a patron of a
restaurant must expect a bone in a chicken sandwich either be-
cause chicken bones are occasionally found there or are natural to
chicken. 712
The courts are apparently satisfied that applying the consumer
expectation test is the proper way to resolve the defect question in
these types of cases. Throughout this section, it has been argued that
the consumer expectation test is an acceptable first-level test for de-
fect that establishes a minimum below which no product should fall.
However, even if a product meets consumer expectations, it can still
be declared defective if it fails to meet the standard of reasonable-
ness utilizing risk-utility analysis. This would lead to the observation
that, even in the food product cases, the consumer expectation test
should not be the sole test for defect. If it is economically feasible to
remove the chicken bones from the sandwich spread without nega-
tively affecting the taste, why should the defendant be exculpated
merely because consumers expect some chicken bones to be present?
The food cases should logically follow the two-step process of Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.21 3 and be placed under the scrutiny of
risk-utility analysis, even if the product meets consumer
expectations.
VII. SCREENING THE FAILURE TO WARN CASES
Manufacturers who seek to defend their products against failure
to warn allegations face extraordinary difficulties. If the warning
case gets beyond the judge and into the hands of the jury, it is diffi-
cult to sustain the contention that on risk-utility grounds, the warn-
ing need not have been given. Unlike the design defect case, where
the plaintiff seeks to convince the court that the alternative design
should have been substituted, the failure to warn case does not at-
tack the product at all. The design case usually requires expert testi-
mony to establish the practicality and efficacy of the alternative de-
272. Id. at 331-32, 103 N.W.2d at 68-69.
273. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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sign. It is subject to attack in that the costs of the alternative design
may be too great or the overall utility of the product lessened by the
suggested change. The failure to warn case is the poor man's design
defect case. The plaintiff need not suggest complex design changes;
he need only claim that words of caution were called for. Warnings
are not inherently expensive. A few additional words on a label are
hardly the stuff that can be defended against risk-utility attack If
frivolous cases are to be defensible, the protection must come from
the courts who must take upon themselves the responsibility of
screening such cases from juries through directed verdict practice.
Two recent Michigan appellate cases demonstrate that such ju-
dicial screening can be accomplished by the courts. In Dunn v. Led-
erie Laboratories,7 4 the plaintiff used the manufacturer of Sabin
vaccine after she was infected with polio as a result of diapering her
daughter who had been vaccinated with the live-type Sabin vaccine.
In upholding a jury verdict for the defendant, the court found that
the commonly held belief that warnings are inexpensive is not sup-
portable. The court held that "sensory overload" was a problem to
be reckoned with.275 The court professed agreement with my position
that
"[w]arnings, in order to be effective, must be selective. They must
call the consumer's attention to a danger that has a real probability
of occurring and whose impact will be significant. One must warn
with discrimination since the consumer is being asked to discrimi-
nate and to react accordingly. The story of the boy who cried wolf
is an analogy worth contemplating when considering the imposition
of a warning in a case of rather marginal risk. . . . Those who
argue for warning as the judicial solution to latent defect cases la-
bor under a naive belief that one can warn against all significant
risks. The truth is that such a marketing scheme is not feasible.
The warning process, in order to have impact, will have to select
carefully the items which are to become part of the consumer's
mental apparatus while using the product. Making the consumer
account mentally for trivia or guard against risks that are not
likely to occur imposes a very real societal cost ...
"In short, when calculating the burden of precaution which is
part of the risk-utility calculus, it will be necessary to focus on
costs other than the cost of label printing. The efficacy of warning
is a societal cost of substantial importance. ' 27 6
274. 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982).
275. Id. at 81, 328 N.W.2d at 580.
276. Id. at 81-82, 328 N.W.2d at 581 (quoting Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler,
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The court concluded that considering the slight risk of contracting
polio, the variability of the risks of harm, and other policy reasons, it
would not broaden the requirement of warning to this fact situation.
The willingness of the court to examine the social costs of warn-
ings bodes well for those advocating active judicial review of product
design and warning standards. It gives evidence that courts are able
to remove from the judicial theater those cases that significant public
policy dictates are ill-starred.
A recent Michigan Supreme Court case gives further evidence
of such judicial capability. In Antcliff v. State Employees Credit
Union,2" the plaintiff sued a manufacturer of scaffolding for failing
to instruct or provide directions for the safe rigging of a scaffold. In
upholding the lower court's refusal to consider the failure to warn
theory, the court said:
The scaffold was not found by the jury to be defective. The most
that can be said of the accident is that the load-bearing capacity of
the rigging system designed by plaintiff Howard Antcliff and his
co-worker was insufficient to support the powered scaffold. This led
to the system's collapse. We are unable to conclude that the scaf-
fold's weight was a dangerous propensity which necessitates vindi-
cation of the policy. In addition, plaintiff Howard Antcliff and his
co-worker were both journeyman painters. In view of their knowl-
edge and experience as riggers, we feel constrained to charge them
with full appreciation of the danger of inadequately supporting the
scaffold on which they worked. As a result, the circumstances here
(a non-defective product lacking in dangerous propensities and a
known or obvious product-connected danger) do not support appli-
cation of the policy which would require Spider to provide instruc-
tions for the safe rigging of its product.
Moreover, the contrary conclusion would lead to demonstrably
unfair and unintended results. There are countless skilled opera-
tions such as the rigging of scaffolding, which involve otherwise
non-dangerous products in potentially dangerous situations. A
manufacturer of such a product should be able to presume mastery
of the basic operation. The more so when, as here, the manufac-
turer affirmatively and successfully limits the market of its product
to professionals. In such a case, the manufacturer should not be
burdened with the often difficult task of providing instructions on
how to properly perform the basic operation. 278
Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 15, at 514-17).
277. 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814 (1982).
278. Id. at 639-41, 327 N.W.2d at 820-21 (footnotes omitted).
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It is not necessary to agree with the court's conclusion in order
to applaud its technique. The court was concerned that the warning
syndrome was being overdone. Sophisticated and skilled workers
rarely pay attention to boiler plate instructions but instead rely on
their own substantial expertise. The court carefully limited its deci-
sion to the specific fact pattern before it. Nonetheless, it is clear that
judicial screening was carefully at work.
CONCLUSION
The law of torts is entering a new era. The days of unbridled
jury discretion are numbered. I have attempted to demonstrate that
significant judicial screening is already taking place. The question of
the day is whether courts will have the wisdom to accelerate the pro-
cess and save the tort system from collapse. If they do not take im-
mediate action, we can expect regressive legislation at the federal
level. Those who believe that tort law has served the country well,
must realize that the time for creative constraint has arrived. I be-
lieve that to accomplish this restraint, courts have no alternative but
to focus their attention on fundamental duty concepts.
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